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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HYRUM WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corp-
oration, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7471 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case and the statement of facts 
as contained and recited in appellant's brief are, in the 
main, correct, but in some instances the appellant has mis-
_stated certain facts and in other instances appellant has 
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2 
included some measure of argument in connection with his 
statement of facts. In admitting the appellant's statement 
of facts to be substantially correct respondent of course 
does ndadmit argumentative matters included in such state-
ment of facts. 
Respondent will follow appellant's method of designat-
ing citations from the testimony with the page and the in-
dication R-1 or R-2 showing whether the record refers to 
the transcript from the first trial or from the second trial. 
The issues and the facts supporting them as contained 
in the pleadings and shown by the evidence in this case are 
fairly simple. Hyrum Williams, a long-time employe of 
· The Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, had under 
his charge three switches-two immediately to the west 
and one a short distance to the east of the river bridge 
where the Union Pacific main lines cross the Weber River. 
During his shift of eight hours 8 or 10 trains passed these 
switches, for only 6 or 7 of which trains was the plaintiff 
required to change or manipulate the switches for such 
movements. The plaintiff thus was not required to change 
or align the switches "every time" any train moved over 
the tracks as stated by appellant on page 4 of his brief, but 
would align the switches for 6 or 7 out of the 8 or 10 move-
ments (R. 76-1.) 
On the morning of December 9, 1946, shortly after he 
reported for work and while attempting .to manipulate the 
middle, or No.2 of the three switches, Mr. Williams slipped 
and fell and broke the large bone of his left leg about three 
inches below the knee. He testified that he stood on the 
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switch ties while trying to manipulate the switch; that the 
left tie was covered with ice and slippery. At the top. of 
page 6 of his brief appellant states that it was below freez-
ing; however, Exhibits L, M and 13 show the temperature 
above freezing for a 10-hour period prior to the time of the 
accident, the temperature ranging between 33° and 35°. 
Admittedly, this was near freezing and for a short period 
of time, prior to 10 to 12 hours before the accident, the 
temperature did get slightly below freezing (See Ex. M). 
Appellant in his statement of facts on page 8 states 
that plaintiff had seen other men stand on the switch ties in 
manipulating the switch on frequent occasions, as had 
Beckett who testified for plaintiff. The record is not en-
tirely clear concerning plaintiff's own testimony other than 
repetitions of the statement that there was no regular or 
customary way to throw a switch, nor any rules or regula-
tions with respect to how such a switch should be thrown 
(R. 46-49-2). Plaintiff did not directly testify that he had 
seen the other men standing on the switch ties to manipulate 
the switch but merely said he had seen other men manipu-
late these switches and then added that there was, no cus-
tomary or regular way to do so. As for his witness Beckett, 
the direct question was asked of Beckett concerning his 
manipulating of such switches, "Do you, yourself, place 
your feet on those switch ties?" (R. 137-2), to which he 
answered directly and positively, "No sir." On being further 
pressed by counsel for plaintiff Beckett said that in closing 
the switch ".You would come back toward the tie and it 
would naturally put your feet in position to come in contact 
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with the tie." But nowhere did Beckett say that he stood 
on the ties to throw the switch and the only direct answer 
upon the question given by him was the answer as stated 
above, "No sir." When Beckett was questioned as to whether 
he had seen other men throwing this or similar switches 
from a position on the ties he evaded answering the question 
directly and again said, "As you align the switch back to 
the main line you will naturally,-your feet naturally 'come 
over toward the tie, the switch ties which hold the switch 
stand" (R. 138-2). 
Counsel for appellant in referring to the testimony, as 
well as in his argument concerning plaintiff's Requested 
Instruction No. 4, talks about sprinkling of sand or salt 
on the ties ·or in the area of the switch, and on the bottom 
of page 9 and the top of page 10 he refers to the fact that 
no salt or sand had been thrown around in the area, although 
at other areas of the yard there was salt and sand provided. 
Counsel misstates the record in that respect because no-
w here in the record is there any evidence of any sand being 
\ 
~used anywhere around the vicinity of switches. Mr. Wil-
liams admitted (R. 107-2) that there had been no salt used 
around the switches or ties in question in all the years that 
he had worked there, although he understood that there was 
salt used at some other switches in the yard. Beckett testi-
fied that salt was used at other places in the Ogden Yard, 
particularly· in the vicinity of the slip switches (R. 140-2). 
He admitted, however, that the so-called slip or ball switches 
do not have electrically controlled switches for the opera-
tion of semaphores (R. 150-2), and it was admitted that the 
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switch in question was a main line switch with bonded 
wires from which the switch points operated main line 
semaphores. Neither Beckett nor Williams gave any evi-
dence concerning sand being used in connection with these 
or any other switches. In spite of that, counsel for appellant 
insisted on injecting the question of the use of both salt 
and sand in the area of the switches in question. 
With respect to the progress and recovery of Mr. Wil-
liams after the cast was placed on his broken leg, appellant 
inadvertently or otherwise again misstates the record. 
Near the top of page 12 of appellant's brief it is stated that 
on February 20, 1947, x-rays revealed callus formation and 
early incomplete bony union. Appellant is in error in that 
. st;J,tement because the x-ray which refers to the incomplete 
bony union was an x-ray taken on January 31, 1947, and on 
the same page (R. 29-1) the doctor who was testifying from 
the x-rays so stated that the January 31 x-rays showed an 
incomplete bony union, but with respect to the x-ray taken 
on February 20 the doctor stated, "By that time there was 
a good bone union" ( R. 29-1) . 
ARGUMENT 
In appellant's brief, although ten separate statements 
of error are. set forth, appellant combines some of such 
statements of error and argues on six points. In such argu-
ment appellant has overlapped and has argued upon the 
same charge or error under more than one of his designated 
points. Respondent will address its argument to the same 
six points as specified by appellant. In appellant's state-
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ment of errors he lists ten separate statements wherein he 
charges the trial court with error. However, with respect 
to such statements of error he does not argue anything with 
respect to paragraphs numbered 3, 5 and 8. We therefore 
assume that by failing to argue upon such claimed errors 
appellant has waived them. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL FOL-
LOWING THE FIRST TRIAL. (Appellant's 
Statement of Points 9) 
It is rather interesting to note that in this case counsel 
who appear for the plaintiff, Hyrum Williams, find them-
selves on the opposite side of the question to that which they 
recently argued before this court in the case of King v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 212 P. (2d) 692, decided by this court 
within the past year. In that case the, jury in the trial court 
had returned a verdict in favor of the defendant "no cause 
of action" and the trial court, at plaintiff's request, granted 
a motion for a new trial. The jury on the second trial of the 
case returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $75,-
000.00, which, however, was reduced by the court to $50,-
000.00. Counsel who now represent respondent in this case 
represented the appellant i~ that case and argued that the 
trial court had abused its discretion in granting the new 
trial. Such position was, of course, strenuously opposed by 
counsel who are counsel for plaintiff herein and in their 
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brief and in arguing upon the case the same counsel argued 
very strenuously and with good effect that the trial court 
had a wide range of discretion in acting upon a motion for 
new trial. We wish now to call those same matters to the 
attention of the same counsel and of this court and strenu-
ously insist that the trial court in this case was acting justi-
fiably within a discretion committed to him when he granted 
a new trial after the original jury's verdict. 
We admit the law as quoted by counsel from Utah 
Code Annotated on page 18 of appellant's brief and respond-
ent will likewise quote and adopt the holding of this court in 
the case of Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. Co., 44 .Utah 100, 138 P. 
1185. We will not requote as much .from that case as coun-
sel for appellant has, but do wish to call the following to the 
court's attention as stated by this court therein: 
"* * * A court, vacating a verdict and 
granting a new trial by merely setting up his 
opinion or judgment against that of a jury, but 
usurps judicial power and prostitutes the constitu-
tional trial by jury. Still the jury cannot be per-
mitted to go unbridled and unchecked. Hence the 
Code that a new trial on motion of the aggrieved 
party may be granted by the court below on the 
ground of 'excessive damages appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice.' 
Whenever that is made to OJfJtpear, the court, when 
its action is properly invoked, should require a re-
mission or set the verdict aside and grant a new 
trial. But, before the court is justified to do that, it 
should clearly be made to appear that the jury total-
ly mistook or disregarded the rules of law by which 
the damages were· to be regulated, or wholly mis-
conceived or disregarded all the evidence, and by 
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so doing committed gross and palpable error by 
rendering a verdict so enormous or outrageous or 
unjust as to be attributable to neither the charge 
nor the evidence, but only to passion or prejudice. 
Whether a new tria~ should or should not be granted 
on this ground, of necessity, must largely rest within 
the sound discretion of the trial court." (Italics 
ours.) 
In determining whether or not the trial court exercised 
a sound judicial discretion or abused his discretion we must 
look to the facts given in evidence in the case and must bear 
in mind that the trilal court had the opportunity to observe 
the witnesses as they testified, and particularly had the 
·opportunity to observe the plaintiff, Mr. Williams; his man-
ner of testifying; his manner of moving in and out and 
around the courtroom; and the inconvenience, if any, which 
he still suffered in view of the fact that he testified that 
even at the time of the. trial he could not do the work re-
quired of him in tending these switches to let 6 or 7 trains 
pass by them during an 8-hour shift (R. 55-1). In consider-
ing this evidence we must remind counsel that the verdict 
of the jury was not $12,000.00 but that the original jury's 
verdict was for $20,000.00, the total amount prayed for by 
plaintiff. We must keep in mind that the injury suffered by 
Williams while it was a broken leg-yes, one bone of the 
lower leg broken in two places, yet there was no dispro-
portioning of the bone-bone shift. The bone appeared to be 
perfectly straight ( R. 25-1) , and after the cast was put on 
the doctor testified that the x-ray "shows the fragment of 
the tip in excellent position and alignment" (R. 28-1, 34-1). 
It is true that the original cast placed on the leg was re-
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moved about March 25, 1947 and had to be replaced on May 
26, 1947. However, on February 20th there was a good bone 
union and the cast was left on until March 25th, and after 
the cast was removed on March 25th the plaintiff was 
walking with a cane and the doctor at that time said that he 
should be able to return to work in 7 to 10 days (R. 30-1). 
In spite of that fact something happened and on May 26th 
when an x-ray was taken a fracture line appeared in the 
leg and another cast was put on. True, Williams testified 
that he had not had any subsequent injury, and while de-
fendant had no testimony to show that he had suffered any 
subsequent injury, we do not think that Williams' testimony 
as thus given must be believed at all events, particularly in 
view of the fact that after his release after the cast was 
removed on March 25th, even though the doctor did see him 
from time to time thereafter, "it was not until May when 
he came back and·complained of the excess pain" (R. 39-1). 
Williams insisted, even up to the time of the trial, that he 
could not do the work of handling those switches even-
though such a job was considered as a "pension job" (R. 
74-2), and yet the doctor testified: "On October 3, 1947 my 
records show he was released for work. We talked it over 
with Hyrum and agreed that the case was finished and 
closed and it was O.K. to return to work" (R. 34-1). The 
doctor stated that Williams' recovery was a good recovery 
· and entirely normal and on his release it was the opinion 
of the doctor that Williams could have done any work that 
he had done before (R. 35-1). This evidence was all before 
the trial court and during the giving of it the court was able 
to observe not only the doctor and other witnesses who 
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testified, but also was able to observe Williams and see 
how he was able to get about, to come and go, and to evaluate 
the testimony from the standpoint of personalities as well 
as from the cold facts of the record. 
Counsel for appellant insist that plaintiff's lost wages 
I 
aloNe up to the time of the trial amounted to $3,900.00. In 
that respect we must advise counsel that the record is not 
clear as to what his lost wages would amount to over any 
period of time. Williams testified that his average wage 
was $250.00 to $260.00 a month, but that was not his take-
home pay-that ~vas before deductions (R. 56-1). There is 
nothing in the record anywhere to show what his deductions 
were or what the net amount of his take-home pay was. 
Also, Williams took· his retirement in October of 1947 and 
there is nothing in the record to show what his retirement 
pay was, whether he received as a result of his long years of 
service 50% of his normal pay, or more, or less. Therefore 
there is nothing in the record to show what Williams lost 
by way of wages and the most that can be done is to specu-
late with respect thereto and upon such speculation we 
can conclude that up to the time when he took his retire-
ment he had been off work for approximately ten months, 
during which time he would have received something less 
than $2,500.00 (minimizing deductions that would have 
been taken from his pay-check). 'Thus, instead of having. 
lost wages in the amount of $3,900.00, Williams' lost wages 
would be somewhere closer to the figure of $2,500.00. On 
that basis, with the court stating as he did that $5,000.00 
should have been sufficient total damages even assuming 
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negligence on the part of the defendant, it would leave to 
'Villiams $2,500.00 for lost wages and $2,500.00 for his pain 
and suffering, the 40 7c cut from the $5,000.00 being based 
on contributory negligence attributable to Williams as found 
by the jury. 
Again we must remind counsel that the original jury's 
verdict was $20,000.00, and with lost wages of somewhere 
in the neighborhood of $2,500.00, that would have left $17,-
500.00 for pain and suffering with a very serious q~estion 
having been raised as to whether or not the second cast 
necessitated on Williams' leg was a result o~ an additional 
injury suffered after the doctor had originally released him 
on March 25th, with no complaint from him until May 23rd. 
It is interesting to note that counsel state on page 24 
of appellant's brief, "Had the court reduced the verdict by 
a lesser sum perhaps a different situation would have been 
presented." By such a statement counsel, in effect, admit 
that the original verdict of $20,000.00 was high and al-
though the court may have been justified in reducing it 
counsel, in effect, argue that he should not have reduced it 
as much as he did. We will ask counsel if they admit that 
the $20,000.00 verdict was excessive, and will ask again 
what their suggestion might have been had the court pre-
sented a different situation by reduci:Q.g the verdict by a 
lesser sum. The amount of $20,000.00 was the amount that 
plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel asked in their pleadings 
and after the first trial they did not change the request 
but left it at the $20,000.00, and now counsel admit that 
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a different question would have been presented had the 
court reduced the verdict by a lesser sum. 
Throughout all of their argument on Point I counsel 
for appellant take the attitude that a new trial deprived 
the pla1ntiff of the right to recover what he thought he 
was entitled to. The plaintiff was not forced to take the $3,-
000.00 to which the -court reduced the judgment after de-
ducting for contributory negligence. He was given the al-
ternative of a new trial and counsel insist that he was denied 
justice by being given the right to a new trial. 
It may be possible that in exercising his discretion in 
attempting to cut the amount of the original jury's verdict 
the Judge did assume a figure that was somewhat too low, 
but that would not say the original figure as submitted by 
the jury was not too high. Nevertheless, the mere granting 
of a new trial as an alternative is a mode of saving plain-
tif~so that he can start over again if the court, in his opinion, 
places the amount too low. If, in every case where the 
court concludes that the damages were excessive, the trial 
court could reduce the amount and compel the plaintiff to 
take such an amount, then a plaintiff or appellant in such a 
position as appellant occupies here might at times find 
himself. in a position where a court in evaluating the evi-
dence might have placed an amount too low. Even under 
such circumstances I do not believe that such a plaintiff or 
appellant could urge that the court's action had been arbi-
trary or capricious. The honest judgment of one man or the 
honest judgment of one Judge is not always the same as the 
honest judgment of another, and that is one of the reasons 
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why a litigant is given the option in such cases of accepting 
the reduced amount or taking a new trial. Upon the new 
trial the plaintiff had as much chance as the defendant did 
and the granting of a new trial did not deny substantial 
justice to the plaintiff. 
As is stated in the Jensen case, cited supra, whether 
a new trial should or should not be granted, of necessity, 
must largely rest within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and in any case, any ruling made by the court with 
opposing litigants must be against one or the other of such 
litigants and it cannot be said that in every instance where 
a Judge rules against one litigant that he does so because of 
bias or prejudice on his own behalf or as a result of any abuse 
of discretion. The power of trial courts to be able to control 
the verdicts of juries to some extent should be maintained in 
our system of jurisprudence. As was stated by the Appellate 
Court of the State of California in' DuVall v. Boos Bros. 
Cafeteria Co., 187 P. 767: 
. "The trial court should be vigilant to set aside 
verdicts where there is reason to believe passion, 
prejudice or sympathy has influenced the jury." 
In the case of Bonner v. Los Angeles Examiner, (Cal.) 
62 P. (2d) 427, the California Appellate Court said: 
"The granting of a new trial is a rna tter resting 
so largely in the discretion of the trial court that its 
action will not be disturbed upon appeal except upon 
a manifest and unmistakable abuse. On appeal, every 
presumption is in favor of the order, and the plain-
tiff must show affirmatively that the order was 
erroneous. Rosenberg v. George A. Moore & Co., 
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194 Cal. 392, 396, 229 P. 34. It has been said and 
quoted over and over again that 'it is only in rare 
instances and upon very strong grou:p.ds that the 
- supreme court will set aside an order granting a 
new trial.' 2 Cal. J ur. 905, and cases cited. This 
rule arises largely from the fact that the order 
granting a new trial does not finally dispose of the 
case, but le'aves it for retrial upon the merits. 
* * * * * 
"On appeal from such an order, however, an 
appellate court will not disturb the order if there 
is a reasonable or fairly debatable justi!ication for 
it. It has been said and often quoted 'that the trial 
court. should be vigilant to set aside verdicts where 
there is reason to believe. that passion, prejudice or 
sympathy has influenced the jury to give more than 
the facts reasonably warrant. No definite rule can 
be announced as to when a verdict is or is not so 
excessive within these rules, but it is settled that an 
order granting a new trial for excessive damages 
will not be disturbed if there is a reasonable or fair-
ly debatable justification therefor." 
This court has had occasion to pass upon the question 
of the granting or refusing of new trials in several recent 
cases. In the case of Moser v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile In-
stitution, ... Utah ... , 197 P. (2d) 136, this court said: 
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit of 
·any serious dispute that the question of granting or 
denying a motion for a new trial is a matter largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. * * * 
This court cannot substitute its discretion for that 
of the trial court. * * * We do not ordinarily 
interfere with rulings of the trial court in ·either 
granting or denying a motion for a new trial, and 
unless abuse of or failure to exercise discretion on 
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the part of the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the 
ruling of the trial judge will be sustained." 
In the case of K-ing v. Union Pacific R. Co., 212 P. (2d) 
692, ... Utah ... , which 've have already referred to, this 
court had the question squarely presented to it because the 
sole error assigned in that case was that the court had 
abused its discretion in granting a new trial after the jury 
had returned a verdict of no cause of action. In that case 
this court referred not only to prior Utah cases but to num-
erous cases from other jurisdictions. It referred to and 
quoted from the California case of Rose v. Carter, 84 P. 
(2d) 174, to the effect that the order of a trial court in · 
either granting or denying a new trial will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless it appears that there was a manifest abuse 
I 
of discretion. 
Also to the Oklahoma case of Belford v. Allen, 86 P. 
(2d) 676, wherein the court held: 
"Where the evidence is conflicting the trial 
judge has the duty to weigh the evidence and to ap-
prove· or disapprove the verdict, and if the verdict is 
such that in the opinion of the trial court it should 
not be permitted to stand, and it is such that he 
cannot conscientiously approve it and believes it 
should be for the opposite party, it is his duty to set 
it aside for a new trial." 
In the King case, cited supra, it was contended by the 
defendant, "That if a trial judge is allowed to set aside a 
verdict returned by a jury which is supported by substantial 
competent evidence, there results an infringement upon its 
right to trial by jury." That is very similar to the position 
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taken by counsel for appellant in this case, as appellant 
argues that substantial rights were denied plaintiff because 
the court reduced the amount of the judgment, or, in the 
alternative, required the plaintiff to accept a new trial. As 
this court said in the King case, supra:. 
"There is no merit in this contention. 
* * * * * 
" 'Trial by jury' * * * is a trial by a jury 
of 12 men in the presence and under the superin~ 
tendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on 
the law and to ad vise them of the facts, and (except 
on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their 
verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the law or 
the evidence.' 
* * * * * 
"In Whitfield v. De Brincat, 35 Cal. App. 2d 
4 7 6, 96 P. 2d 156, the court declared that the con-
stitutional right in certain proceedings to have issues 
determined by a jury is subject to the wide discre-
tion of the trial court, and that the rule that the 
trial judge, when convinced that the evidence is 
insufficient to justify the verdict or that the weight 
of the evidence is against the decision, should grant 
a new trial, is a salutary one for the protection of 
litigants." 
At the conclusion of his argument on Point I appellant 
charges the court with "utter and complete disregard for the 
uncontroverted evidence presented by plaintiff." We can-
not understand what appellant means by such a charge and 
what he means by the phrase "uncontroverted evidence." 
It is true that the fact that plaintiff suffered the injury of 
a broken leg, with attendant pain and suffering, was not 
controverted. The question as to the amount of, damage 
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claimed by plaintiff, ho\vever, was controverted. Plaintiff 
alleged in his complaint that he had been damaged in the 
amount of $20,000.00, which charge was denied by defend-
ant. The only evidence giving any monetary basis upon 
which the jury could figure plaintiff's damages was that 
plaintiff's average wage had ,been $250.00 per month before 
deductions, and prior to his retirement October 15, 1947. 
The amount of the deductions was not shown and the 
amount of his retirement pay was not shown. The question 
as to defendant's liability was very seriously controverted 
and very fully controverted by the evidence. As was said 
by this court in the King case, supra, at page 698: 
"\\Te cannot agree with the trial judge that the 
evidence is 'uncontroverted' in· the two respe·cts 
mentioned by him in his decision. However, as has 
been pointed out, it is not necessary that the evi-
dence be uncontroverted in favor of the moving party 
before the trial court can grant a new· trial." 
There is one point which we think counsel for appellant 
have overlooked in their argument, and that is, the fact that 
the trial court could have granted a new trial without re-
quiring any remission from the verdict as given by the 
original jury. A trial court is not limited in such cases 
in granting new trials. We may admit that reasonable men 
might differ as to whether a $5,000.00 verdict would have 
been sufficient as the trial judge insisted in his ruling on 
the motion for a new trial. At the same time, we feel that 
most reasonable men would not disagree on the proposition 
that $20,000.00, the amount of the original verdict, was 
excessive in all events. 
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This court has had before it a similar question re-
cently in the case of Duffy v. Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, .. Utah .. , 218 P. (2d) 1080. In that case this. court 
ordered a remittitur where the trial court had refused tore-
duce the damages allowed by the jury, and in the event the 
plaintiff failed to accept the remittitur this court ordered 
that a new trial be granted. In that case the jury returned a 
verdict of $12,500.00. The evidence showed, $1,300.00 in 
loss of wages, and in deciding as above t:Q.is court stated: 
"We must assume that the jury awarded plain-
tiff the sum of $1,300.00 for loss of wages, which 
were his only established special damages, and this 
leaves the sum of $11,200.00 for general damages. 
When we get in this domain reasonable min~s differ 
as to what amount is excessive. However, there 
must be a limit beyond which a reasonable jury can-
not go and the limit must be determined on the gross 
amount of the verdict and not the net amount." 
This court concluded that the damages as a'¥arded by 
the jury were "so -grossly excessive and exorbitant as to 
convince the members of this court that the verdict is far 
in excess of what a reasonable jury could determine as a 
maximum amount awardable for this type of injury. For 
these reasons it appears to us to have been given under the 
influence of passion and prejudice." 
In the case at bar, disregarding the question raised as 
to how or in what manner the second break occurred in 
Williams' leg, and considering the ten months up to the 
time when he should have gone back to work but chose to 
take his retirement instead, the total wages lost to plaintiff 
in his take-home pay would have been something less than 
$2,500.00. Considering the total verdict of $20,000.00, this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
would have left $17,500.00 for general damages. Even if 
we assume, as counsel state, that up to the time of trial 
he had lost $3,900.00 in wages (which cannot be assumed 
because the amount of his pension was not shown), still 
that would leave in excess of $16,000.00 as general damages. 
Clearly the same can be said in this case, as was in the Duffy 
case, "There must be a limit beyond which a reasonabl~ jury 
cannot go and the limit must be determined on the gross 
amount of the verdict and not the net amount." 
We submit that Judge Hendricks was honest in the 
exercise of his discretion and in concluding that the jury's 
verdict of $20,000.00 in this case was excessive. The plain-
tiff was not required to accept the amount as remitted by 
the Judge and the fact that a new trial was granted does 
not infringe upon plaintiff's right to trial by jury, as this 
court decided in the King case, supra. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not err 
in granting defendant's motion for a new trial following the 
first trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 4 AND 5, MAT-
TERS IN SAID REQUESTS WHICH WERE 
PROPER HAVING BEEN OTHERWISE GIV-
EN IN SUBSTANCE. (Appellant's Statement of 
Points 1 and 2.) 
We do not dispute as a general proposition the law re-
ferred to by counsel for appellant in their argument under 
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Point No. II, because we admit that "each party to a suit 
is entitled to have his theory, when there is evidence to 
sustain it, submitted to the jury * * *" In accepting 
that law, we want to remind counsel for the appellant that 
the law also is to the effect, as sated in the case of Toone 
v. J. P. O'Neill Const. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, 16, that: 
"* * * The court was not bound to charge 
the jury in separate instructions, but could cover 
the question in one without offending against appel-
lant's rights." 
In the case at bar the court briefly and in simple 
language stated both the theory of plaintiff and the theory 
of defendant in Instruction No. 9. 
It will be noted that in each of the cases cited by coun-
sel under their Point No. II, that the question was raised 
because the court had refused to give certain instructions 
requested by counsel. We think that appellant's counsel in 
this case must admit that if no specific instructions on any 
particular point are requested, then error cannot be charged 
against the court for failure to instruct upon such point. 
It will also be noted that the court in several, if not most 
of such cases, contrary to appellant's argument, held that the 
theories of each had been given. In the Toone case, above 
referred to, the court had modified one of appellant's re-
quests, and in ruling upon the matter wherein appellant 
had contended its theory had not been properly presented, 
it was stated : 
_ "Appellant's theory of the evidence was suf-
ficiently covered by what the court told the jury, and 
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hence it was not prejudiced by the court's modifica-
tion referred to." 
As a preface to our argument upon this point, we wish 
to call the attention of the court and counsel to two rules of 
law. One is that if a request is in part incorrect, or it is 
· · · · ~ · inappropriate if applied to the 'facts, the court commits no 
. error in wholly refusing it. The court is not required. to 
weed out and reject the bad and give only the good part. 
The request must be correct in all respects. 
Yenot· et ux. v. Spokane United Rys., 255 P. 947. 
Wiley v. Young, 174 P. 316. 
Colburn v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 6 P. (2d) 
635. 
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 11 P. (2d) 
142. 
MacDonald v. Calkins, 251 P. 458. 
The second proposition we wish to refer to is that "the 
general rule is that unless the party requests an instruction 
on a special matter, he cannot predicate error upon the 
court's failure to charge." 
State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 P. (2d) 727. 
Taylor v. L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 61 Utah 5~24, 2il6· 
P. 239. 
In the Miller case this court stated: 
"Our Utah Code provides that in a criminal 
trial, 'When the evidence is concluded the court must 
charge the jury as in ci vii actions.' Sec. 105-32-1 ( 5) , 
U. C. A. 1943. In civil actions Sec. 104-24-14 ( 4), 
U. C. A. 1943, provides that, 'When the evidence is 
.concluded the court shall instruct the jury in writing 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
upon the law applicable to the case, * * * .' This 
requirement that the court instruct 'upon the law 
applicable to the case' does not place upon the court 
alone the burden of making up instructions which 
cover every question which may have arisen in the 
case.'' 
In this connection it is interesting to note that the 
trial court accepted and used the help given him by both 
counsel in their requests, and keeping in mind the rule last 
stated, we would like to look at the requests as submitted 
by plaintiff and see which of those requests were actually 
given by the court. Plaintiff requested only six instructions. 
The entire content of plaintiff's requested Instruction No.1 
was contained and given in the court's Instruction No. 2. 
Plaintiff~s requested Instruction No. 2 was also embodied 
in and given in the court's Instruction No. 2. Plaintiff's re-
quested Instruction No. 3 was given verbatim as the court's 
Instruction No. 8. Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 6 
was given almost verbatim as the court's Instruction No. 
22. This leaves only plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 
4 and No.5 as not being given directly and almost verbatim, 
and as shown by the endorsements of the court thereon, it 
was at least the trial court's opinion that he had given the 
substance of them-at least they were so given in so far 
as the same were applicable to the evidence in the case. 
Instruction No. 4 as requested by plaintiff was and 
would have been entirely improper for the court to give. 
That 'instruction in effect would have told the jury to, or 
would have authorized them to find the defendant negligent 
if they found "that defendant failed and neglected to render 
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such (plaintiff's) footing safe by sprinkling salt or sand 
in the area of said switch * * * ." Such an instruction 
would have been entirely improper under the pleadings and 
evidence in the case. No negligence was charged in the 
pleadings for failure to use salt or sand, neither having been 
mentioned in the pleadings at all. The defendant's wit-
nesses testified that neither salt nor sand was ever used 
around these switches and that it would be improper to do 
so (R. 172, 174, 175, 181, 211-2). One of plaintiff's wit-
nesses did testify that salt had been made available at some 
of the S\vitch shanties elsewhere in the Ogden yard, but 
none had ever been available at these switches, and plain-
tiff himself not only testified that none had ever been used at 
these switches but also that he had never requested any 
here (R. 78-1). The switches in the yard where salt had 
been used were not switches connected up with or con-
trolling electric semaphore circuits (R. 175, 176-2), and 
testimony of the defendant's witnesses was undisputed that 
not only was salt not used at these electrically activated 
switches but it was improper and against the rules to use 
it (R. 181, 211-2). None had ever been used at this switch 
to plaintiff's own knowledge (R. 44, 45-1) (R. 107-2). 
None of plaintiff's witnesses testified that sand had been 
used or that it would have been proper to use it. -On the 
other hand, the defendant's witnesses testified that it would 
have been improper to use sand and that it was never done, 
and the section foreman gave the reason stating that if sand 
were used it would soon fill up the pores in the gravel ballast 
so that the melting snows or surface waters would puddle 
and not seep away into the ballast (R. 175, 211-2). 
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Before Instruction No. 4 would have been proper, it 
would have been necessary for the court to reframe it. It 
would have been necessary to eliminate any question with 
respect to sand and it would also have been necessary to 
add another instruction directing or authorizing the jury 
to find from the conflicting evidence whether it was usual 
or proper to have, or whether reasonable care under the 
circumstances required defendant to have salt available, 
and if they found in the affirmative then whether under 
the circumstances in this case the defendant was negligent 
in not having salt available at this particular switch. The 
requested instruction did not embody the facts of this case 
I 
as it should have done and would have been tantamount to 
directing the jury to find the defendant negligent if the 
jury should find that no salt had been made available or 
used in the area without considering the other circumstances, 
or that they could find the defendant negligent if no sand 
was available or sprinkled in the area where neither plead-
ings nor evidence warranted any such reference to the use 
of sand. 
IF AN INSTRUCTION 'AS REQUESTED IS NOT 
PROPER AND DOES~ NOT FIT THE FACTS AS TESTI-
FIED TO IN A . CASE, THE PARTY REQUESTING 
SUCH AN INSTRUCTION CANNOT ASSIGN ERROR 
BECAUSE TI-IE COURT FAILED' TO REFRAME OR 
REMODEL THE INSTRUCTION TO FIT THE FACTS 
OF THE CASE. Again we say that plaintiff's witnesses 
gave no testimony whatsoever with respect to the use of 
sand, and the only evidence concerning the use of sand 
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showed that it 'vas improper and never done; and the only 
evidence with respect to salt showed that it had never 
been used at switches of this type and had never been re-
quested. In spite of this, the appellant now claims that 
the court should have given his requested Instruction No. 
4, which would have told the jury they could find the de-
fendant negligent if the defendant had failed. to "sprinkle 
salt or sand in the area of such switch." The court did not 
err in refusing to give the instruction as requested but it 
would have been error for the court to have given such in-
structiqn. 
See Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 176 P. (2d) 
111, wherein this court said: 
"The court's statutory duty (Section 104-24-
14(4), U. C. A. 1943) to instruct 'upon the law ap-
plicable to the case' pertains, to the 'case' made by 
the evidence in support of . the allegations in issue. 
Ordinarily to instruct on the law applicable to evi-
dence which did not support allegations upon whieh 
issue was joined or which supported theories outside 
of the scope of the pleadings would be erroneous 
* * *" 
See also: 
Fowler v. M_edical Arts Bldg., 112 Utah 367, 
188 P. (2d) 711. 
State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 
82 Utah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612. 
Appellant has gone to some length in his brief after 
quoting the cases to argue that plaintiff's theory of the 
case was not adequately presented. We would like to ask 
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wherein the plaintiff or his counsel was in any way hamp-
ered in his discussions with the jury in expounding his 
theory of the case or his argument because plaintiff's theory 
of the case had not been covered. There was nothing in the 
instructions which detracted from plaintiff's theory or 
which prevented plaintiff's counsel from taking full ad-
vantage of any argument before the jury which they may 
have desired in connection with that theory, and as a mat-
ter of fact, plaintiff's counsel repeated and stressed and 
reiterated the fact of the freezing weather, the snow and 
ice in the area, and the claim that it was proper for the 
plaintiff to stand on the switch ties to throw the switch. 
In the discussion had with the court concerning the 
instructions as they were given to the jury, and immediately 
following the court's instructing the jury and before argu-
ment, counsel did not complain that plaintiff's theory was 
not presented nor properly covered. After reading the in-
structions to the jury, the following passed between court 
and counsel : 
THE COURT: I will ask ·you gentlemen if you 
observe any error of an elemental nature that you 
want to call to the Court's attention at this time or 
if you desire to take any exceptions that you want to 
argue to the Court. 
MR. MINER: I have -none. 
MR. BLACK: We have none, Your Honor (R. 
229-2). 
After which it was agreed that exceptions would be 
taken after the argument and plaintiff's counsel were 
directed to proceed with their argument to the jury. 
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Even after argument when exceptions were taken, 
counsel, although they did take some exceptions, only ser-. 
iously urged an objection to one instruction. That was to 
Instruction No. 19 as the court had given it, and the court 
made a correction in that instruction and called the jury 
back and gave a substituted instruction to them, with which 
counsel seemed to be entirely satisfied. 
With respect to this question of presenting plaintiff's 
theory to the jury, let us inquire just what plaintiff's theory 
was. We think plaintiff's theory can best be summarized 
by the words of counsel starting with the third line from the 
top on page 73 of appellant's brief, stating: 
"* * * The specific act of negligence relied 
on by plaintiff is that defendant, by and through its 
authorized agents, servants and employees, knew, or 
in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, 
that the weather was at freezing point -and that slush 
and snow around the switch where plaintiff was in-
jured would be frozen and would render footing 
dangerous and unsafe and that defendant failed and 
neglected to make said footing reasonably safe by 
cleaning the ice and snow off the place where switch 
tenders would, in the ordinary performance of their 
duties, be required to stand, move or walk, and that 
said negligent conduct proximately caused, in whole 
or in part, the injuries to plaintiff." 
It is interesting to note that in this statement, which 
is the exact statement of theory used by appellant in argu-
ing on the motion for new trial before the, trial court, ap-
pellant does not follow plaintiff's request No. 4 completely, 
and particularly will it be noted that appellant in such state-
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ment eliminates all reference to salt and sand as was con-
tained in request No. 4. 
Even if such a statement had been put before the court 
in a formal request to give to the jury, there would have 
to he either a modification or an additional instruction to 
enable the jury to determine whether the place in question 
was the place where the "switch tenders would, in the 
ordinary performance of their duties, be required to stand." 
But assuming that such a statement had been presented in 
a request, which it was not, how would it have compared 
with what the court did tell the jury? The words "by and 
through its authorized agents, servants, and employees," 
and anything that such words could convey, were fully cov-
ered by the court's Instruction No. 8, and Instruction No. 
8 was plaintiff's request No. 3 given verbatim. Does the 
statement that there was "slush and snow around the switch" 
and that the weather was "at freezing point," which "would 
render footing dangerous and unsafe" state anything more 
or different than w~s stated by the court where he said. 
that the plaintiff claimed "that the defendant allowed the 
ties on which the switch was located to become * * * 
covered with snow and ice, which caused them to be in a 
slick and slippery and unsafe condition?" There would not 
be ice unless the weather was at freezing point. 
Do the words "that the defendant failed and neglected 
to make said footing reasonably safe by cleaning the ice and 
snow off" say any more than what the court stated, "that 
the defendant al'lowed the ties * * * to become and 
remain covered with snow and ice, which caused them to be 
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in a slick and slippery and unsafe condition?" Without 
adopting the exact words which appellant now uses in his 
brief, but which he never used in any request, the court 
could not have stated much more definitely the position of 
the plaintiff than he did in the short, concise statement as 
given in Instruction No. 9. 
In Instruction No. 8 the court very definitely advised 
the jury that an employer was liable for the negligent acts or 
omissions of any of its employes, and that if the negligence 
of any such employes contributed in whole or in part to 
proximately cause plaintiff's injury, then the negligence of 
those employes becomes the negligence of the employer. 
The court immediately followed with Instruction No. 9 in-
forming the jury as above referred to. The court also in the 
instructions-however in a later instruction-told the jury 
that it was the duty of the railroad company to exercise 
reasonable care to provide its employes with a reasonably 
safe place to work. As a preface to the entire matter, the 
court in its Instruction No. 2 gave' the substance of plain:-
tiff's requests as numbered 1 and 2, stating as a matter of 
law that plaintiff and defendant were engaged in interstate 
commerce and this was a case under the F. E. L.A. and that 
the laws of the State of Utah and Workmen's Compensation 
Laws were not applicable to the case. In Instruction No. 6 
the court told the jury that they should disregard any at-
titudes or knowledge they may have gained from other cases 
concerning the law of negligence applicable to other cases 
and apply only what was given to them in these instructions, 
and the law assumes that the jury follows the court's instruc~ 
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tions rather than assuming to the contrary. Ryan v. Beaver 
County, 82 Utah 27, 21 P. (2d) 858. 
By the instructions which we have quoted and referred 
to hereinabove, plaintiff's theory of the case as summarized 
and stated by plaintiff's own counsel on page 73 of appel-
lant's brief is as effectively put before the jury as it could 
have been without quibbling over mere words. 
Appellant argues at the bottom of page 27 of his brief 
that the jury was not told that if they find the facts as set 
forth in Instruction No. 9, they must find the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Such a 
statement is not true and such an instruction to the jury 
would not be proper. There was no such absolute duty. The 
jury could have found that it was not negligence on the 
part of the defendant to fail to remove all ice and snow from 
these switch ties. It was the plaintiff's theory that defend-
ant allowed such snow or ice to accumulate on these switch 
ties, and plaintiff's contended that such was negligence, 
but even if the jury should find that the defendant had al-
lowed snow and ice to remain on the ties, the jury still had 
the right to decide whether or not the railroad company, 
being charged to do what a reasonable man would have 
done, was negligent in not anticipating that a switchman 
would step on the icy t~es to throw the switch, and the jury 
was entitled to decide whether even if plaintiff's theory 
was true, such action on the part of the defendant amounted 
to negligence. The Court could not direct that it would be 
considered as negligence as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff goes on to complain that the jury should have 
been instructed that if the ties had become and had re-
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mained covered with snow and ice and slick and slippery, 
and that such condition was a cause in whole or in part of 
plaintiff's injuries, the jury should have found for plain-
tiff. Such an instruction would not have been proper be-
cause the jury would have had to find whether or not the 
plaintiff was "required to locate himself" upon the ties 
to do his work, and even then the jury should be the one to 
decide whether allowing the ties to be in such condition 
would be negligence rather than having the court direct 
the jury that it was negligence as a matter of law. Ap-
pellant's counsel seem to proceed on the theory that if the 
jury could have found that the ties were covered with ice 
and snow and that the plaintiff slipped on those ties, that 
t~en there was an absolute duty to instruct the jury to re-
turn a verdict for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel g,ee only 
one side of the case. They see only the point they are in-
terested in and entirely overlook the fact that the jury was 
entitled to determine the question as to whether or not it 
was negligence fortle Defendant to fail to clean all snow and 
ice from the ties and also whether it was. necessary, proper 
or the usual thing to do to stand on the ties to throw the 
switch, or whether the switch could have just as easily, con-
veniently, and more properly have been thrown from a 
position where he would not have been standing on the ties. 
The jury could have found that the ties were slick because 
of the ice and snow and could still have found that such was 
not ~egligence on the part of the defendant or_ that ··the 
plaintiff was guilty of negligence to sueh an extent that his 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. 
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In all of what we have said we must again remind the 
court and counsel that plaintiff is complaining that the jury 
was not instructed so-and-so, and yet by including salt and 
sand in his requested Instruction No. 4, plaintiff went fur-
ther than his avowed theory and by including too much in 
the request cannot charge error on the part of the court 
for failure to give such a request. 
There are numerous instances where the plaintiff could 
have made requests of the court to give instructions which 
would apply more specifically to some of the facts brought 
out in evidence, both from plaintiff's and defendant's wit-
nesses. The defendant submitted three times the number 
of requests that the plaintiff did. Whether or not these re-
quested instructions may have been helpful to the court in 
framing his charge to the jury, the court, insofar as both 
plaintiff and defendant were concerned, co~sidered that he 
had given the substance of all such requests. It is rather 
unfortunate perhaps, for both plaintiff and defendant, that 
counsel does not have the time to prepare requested instruc-
tions after the evidence is all in. Becau~e of this fact it some-
times becomes necessary to anticipate what the evidence 
will be, and there are few cases, if any, where the instruc-
tions as given cover and clearly reflect all the testimony 
that has been given in a case in order to guide the jury in 
its determination thereon. In this particular case the plain-
tiff had had the benefit of one prior trial and could have 
changed his requests or submitted additional ones. Plain-
tiff's requests were substantially the same as on the first 
trial, and the instructions as actually given to the jury were 
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substantially the same on both the first and the second 
trials, the only substantial change being the substitution 
of an additional Instruction No. 19, which was done at the 
request of plaintiff's counsel after the close of the argu-
ment. 
The court cannot be accused of error if no instructions 
are requested that fit the facts of a case and if it refuses 
to give instructions that are broader than the pleadings or 
the evidence, or if it attempts to frame in its own way in-
structions that may fit the evidence or to reframe some of 
the instructions that may be reque~d to try and fit the 
facts of the case. 
It is interesting to note that plaintiff's Instruction No. 
4 as requested was the same at the time of the first trial 
as at the time of the second, and after knowing what the 
evidence on the first trial was, (R. 78, 83, 102, 161, 162, 
179-1) there was no justification whatsoever for including 
any reference to sand in such request, and he could have 
modified such instruction with respect to salt. At the first 
trial such Instruction No. 4 was endorsed by the judge as 
being given in part and in part refused (R. 034-1). In spite 
of the experience on the first trial and the apparent knowl-
edge of what the testimony would be, counsel for plaintiff 
insisted on including the question of sand in their request 
No. 4 on the second trial although there was an entire lack 
of pleading or evidence to justify the same. 
Under his argument on Point II, plaintiff complains 
of the court's refusal to give his requested Instruction No. 
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5. Said request No. 5 contained two paragraphs, the first 
of which was given almost verbatim in the court's Instruc-
tion No. 20, and appellant cannot be heard to quibble over 
words because of the difference in the wording as that por-
tion of the instruction was actually given. The second 
paragraph of said requested Instruction No. 5 had refer-
ence to the furnishing by defendant to plaintiff of a reason-
ably safe place to work and suggested to the jury that if 
they found that the defendant failed to furnish plaintiff 
a reasonably safe place to work "in that it allowed the area 
where plaintiff was required to station himself" to become 
and remain covered with ice, etc., then they should find for 
the plaintiff. Such an instruction by including the state-
ment "where plaintiff was required to station himself," 
assumed a matter which the jury had to decide, and such 
an instruction under the facts of this case would not be 
proper because by the wording there given it would have 
directed the jury to find for the plaintiff if the jury found 
that there was ice and snow on the switch ties where plain .. 
tiff stood to throw the switch regardless of whether the 
jury might or might not.;have otherwise found that it was 
necessary for plaintiff to stand there. In order to have 
rendered such an instruction proper under the facts of this 
case it would have been necessary to have in some way 
included in the instruction not only the qu~stio:n of "if you 
find that the ice and snow rendered the plaintiff's footing 
unsafe," but also "and if you find that it was reasonably 
necessary for plaintiff to stand on said ice covered ties 
where the footing would be unsafe in order to throw said 
switch;" and then if the slippery condition, plus the neces-
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sity of his standing there, proximately caused the accident 
in whole or in part, the plaintiff would have been entitled 
to some verdict, provided, that the jury otherwise found 
that it was negligence on the part of the defendant to allow 
ice and sno'v on the ties in the first place. The matters 
contained in that second paragraph of Instruction No. 5 
were given in substance elsewhere in the instructions be-
sides, and there was no error in the court in refusing to give 
all of the Instruction No. 5 as requested. 
At the top of page 32 of his brief appellant refers to 
proximate cause and states: "There is no such thing as 
'proximate cause' ,under the Federal Employers' Liability 
'\ 
Act." \Ve are surprised at counsel's statement and cannot 
feel that they are serious in urging such a proposition. In 
their argument at the top of page 32 counsel were apparently 
intending to refer to matter contained in the court's In-
struction No. 17 wherein the question of proximate cause is 
raised rather than in Instruction No. 15 of the court's in-
structions immediately preceding counsel's argument at 
the top of page 32. In their brief to the trial court counsel 
attacked the court's Instruction No. 17, then followed with 
the statement referred to above that there was no such thing 
as proximate cause under the F. E. L. A. 
In the case of Reynolds, Administratrix v. Atlantic fgl..EC:/'JJJ~ 
1'7 " . Coast Line Railroad Co., 336 U. S. 207 (Decided February 6 f to>. G,t;.FJ;- · 
1949), the United States Supreme Court sustained the 
Supreme Court of Alabama wherein the Alabama court had 
found that there was some negligence but that the negli-
gence found was not the proximate cause of the accident 
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In question. The Supreme Court of the United States in 
referring to the Alabama court's decision and in affirming 
that court stated : 
"* * * It held, however,. that the facts al-
leged did not show that the accident resulted proxi-
mately, in whole or in part, from that negligence. 
We cannot say that the Supreme Court of Alabama 
erred." 
Again we say, we are surprised at counsel's statement 
because it has been our understanding of the law that liabil .. 
ity in any negligence case does not attach regardless of 
whether it is a federal liability case or any other type of 
case unless such negligence as is chargeable to a defendant 
is shown to be in some manner a proximate cause of an 
I 
injury sustained. 
On page 33 of appellant's brief, after referring to only 
parts of Instructions Nos. 21 and 23 as given by the court, 
counsel complain of instructions as given with respect to 
guess-work, conjecture or speculation, and state that "as 
a matter of legal principle a permissive inference could 
reasonably be deducted that the place of work was unsafe 
because slick and slippery." There was no question of per-
missible or permissive inference in this matter at all. The 
plaintiff and his witness Beckett testified directly to the 
slick and slippery and unsafe condition. It was not neces-
sary for the jury to draw any inference or to guess or 
speculate in any manner whatsoever; the only question was 
as to whether or not the jury would believe the statements of 
these witnesses. If they believed them, no inference was 
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necessary. An inference is permissible where there is no 
direct testimony upon a subject, but where the plaintiff and 
his star 'vitness directly state that the whole area was cov-
ered with ice and snow, that it was all slick and slippery 
and unsafe, there is no question of inference in any manner 
whatsoever, and the fact as to whether or not a court may 
have instructed the jury that they should not guess or specu-
late could not apply to such ·testimony. Appellant seems to 
feel that if the jury believed that the ties were slick and 
slippery and unsafe, then that in and of itself would compel 
a verdict for the plaintiff. Counsel overlook the fact, how-
ever, that there was very definitely in this case a question 
as to whether or not it was negligence on the part of the 
defendant to fail to keep all ice and snow off these switch ties 
or whether or not it was necessary or proper for the plain-
tiff to stand on the ties while manipulating the switch, and 
that was a matter the jury had to determine as well as the 
question of the slick and slippery condition of these ties. 
We firmly disagree with plaintiff's contention that 
plaintiff's requested Instructions No. 4 and No. 5 are cor-
rect statements of the law as applied to the evidence in 
this case, and we think it would have been error for the 
court to give them as requested. We think that the court 
committed no error in refusing them, and we feel that the 
court was justified in his conclusion in ruling upon the 
motion for new trial wherein he stated as follows (R. 244-2) : 
"During the course of the trial I discussed with 
counsel for the plaintiff the instructions that were 
given in the first trial of this case and asked counsel 
if the instructions as given were substantially in 
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accord with their views as to the law covering the 
case. In answer to this, counsel stated that the in-
structions were substantially correct. With the ex-
ception of some minor changes, the instructions as 
given in the second trial were the same as those 
given in the first, and the evidence in both trials 
was substantially the same. If the case were retried, 
it is my judgment that the instructions could be im-
proved upon, but considering the instructions as a 
whole, the plaintiff's theory, in my judgment, was 
adequately presented and the defendant's theory was 
not over emphasized." 
We would like to refer specifically to some of the cases 
cited by counsel, and, have already quoted some from the 
case of Toone v. J. P. O'Neill Const. Co. 
The case of Furkovich v. Bingham Coal and Lumber Co., 
45 Utah 89, 143 P. 121, was a case involving the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur. In that case a request stating that the 
defendant's responsibility was for "ordinary care" or 
"reasonable care" was refused because the court said it was 
not at all adapted to the particular facts and circumstances 
of the case. This court on appeal indicated that had a proper 
request been proposed it should have been given, but no 
otherwise proper request was proposed, and this court held 
it was not error to refuse the one containing merely abstract 
principles. Speaking of the appellant in that case, this 
court said: 
"* * * It offered thirteen requests, all of 
which the court refused. We have carefully examin-
ed all of them, and each, one contains some fault. 
* * * It must suffice to say that because· of the 
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inherent defects contained in each request the court 
'vas fully justified in refusing to give any of them." 
In the case of Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 
Utah 7, 169 P. 868, the defendant had given at least three 
requests covering the same subject matter in a little dif-
ferent way, and this court held that each of the three re-
quests as proposed was entirely proper-none of them con-
taining any objectionable matter-and therefore the court 
should have given one or the other of them, but all were 
refused. That is not true in the case at bar. Both of plain-
tiff's requests, No.4 and No.5, contained objectionable mat-
ter and the substance of such instructions was otherwise 
substantially covered. 
The case of Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co. et al., 
75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160, while stating a general rule as to 
theories in a case, cannot otherwise help the appellant. In 
that case the court had given an instruction referring to the 
duty of a driver of a motor vehicle "at crossings and street 
intersections." The accident involved in that case did not 
happen at a crossing or street intersection, and this court 
sustained the appellant's contention that the giving of an 
instruction which contained matter outside of or in addition 
to the pleadings and evidence in the case was erroneous. 
After citing a number of cases the court concluded: 
"* * * These cases establish the proposition 
that an instruction which related to matters outside 
the issues, or as to which there is no substantial evi-
dence, is improper." 
That case, therefore, could do nothing else but show con-
clusively that the giving of Instruction No. 4 as requested 
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by plaintiff would have been error because it would have 
allowed the jury to find the defe~dant negligent for failure 
to use sand around the switches when the question of sand 
was entirely outside of any pleadings or evidence in the 
case. 
The case of Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 
(2d) 772, is an example of an opposite situation where in-
stead of inserting something not within the evidence or 
pleadings the court's instructions failed to instruct the jury 
with respect to an emergency created by the plaintiff in 
driving on the wrong side of the road. We must -assume 
from the statements in that case that some of the instruc-
tions presented by defendant were proper and could have 
been given, this court stating at page 778: 
"The court should have given some of the de-
fendant's requested instructions pertaining to his 
theory of the case. The defendant submitted 49 re-
quests for instructions, some of whi~h were admit-
tedly repetitious. * * *" 
In the case of McDonald v. Union Pa~ific R. Co., 167 P. 
(2d) 685, the rule with respect to presenting various theories 
is set forth, and counsel quote on page 43 a portion of the 
opinion, ending with the question: "But did the court fail 
in this respect?" Counsel neglected to give this court's 
answer upon that point, which we quote: 
"Keeping in mind that we are now discussing 
whether or not appellant's theory of the case was 
submitted to the jury, and are not discussing how 
well it was submitted, it is believed that a compari-
son of all the quotations, so far set out in this opinion, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
will disclose to the reader that the court follows 
rather closely the alleged facts and the pleadings. 
* * * The court covered these theories as ind~­
cated. but, of course, did not agree wit'h appellant in 
the detail of expounding them. * * *" (Italics 
ours.) 
\Ve submit that the foregoing statement can be applied 
very definitely to the case at bar. 
At the risk of repetition, we wish to call attention to · 
the instructions as they were given by the court and invite 
a comparison between those instructions and the claims 
made by counsel for appellant concerning plaintiff's theory. 
In the court's Instruction No. 2 the court instructed that 
at the time of the accident both the _plaintiff and the defend-
ant were engaged in the conduct of interstate commerce and 
that the plaintiff was acting in the course of his employment. 
The instruction further states : 
"This action is brought under what is known as 
the Federal Employers Liability Act which provides 
in substance, as far as is material in this action, that 
a railroad company while engaged in interstate com-
merce shall be liable in damages to an employee suf-
fering injuries while he is employed by such com-
pany in interstate commerce in cases· where such 
injury results in whole or in part from the railroad 
company's negligence in the operation or mainten-
ance of its appliances or other equipment. The stat-
utes of the State of Utah governing employers liabil-
ity and workmen's compensation are not applicable 
to this case.'' 
In Instruction No. 6 the court instructed the jury to 
disabuse their minds with respect to any law of negligence 
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that they may have gained from any other cases, this in-
struction being given usually at the request of. the plain-
tiff, but at all events being given because the usual rules 
with regard to contributory negligence in other cases do not 
apply in F.E.L.A. cases. 
In Instruction No. 8 the court instructed the jury: 
"An employer is civilly liable for the negligent 
acts or omissions of an employee committed while in 
his service and within the scope of his employment, 
that is, in the transaction of employer's business, 
and if you shall find and believe from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that plaintiff sustained his in-
juries by reason of the negligence of a fellow em-
ployee or fellow employees, (which) contributed in 
whole or in part to proximately cause the plaintiff's 
injuries, then I charge you that such negligence is 
imputed ,to and becomes the negligence of the em-
ployer." 
In Instruction No. 9 the court tells the jury that the 
plaintiff claims that the defendant was guilty of negligence 
in failing to furnish the plaintiff a safe place to work in 
the following particular : 
"That the defendant allowed the ties on which 
the switch was located to become and remain covered 
with snow and ice, which caused them to be in a 
slick and slippery and in an unsafe condition. 
"These allegations of negligence· are denied by 
the defendant. Defendant alleges that the plain-
tiff's injuries were the result of his own negligence." 
Instruction No. 20 reads: 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of the 
defendant railroad company to exercise reasonable 
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care to provide its employees a reasonably safe place 
to work. This duty does not require the absolute 
elimination of all danger, but only requires the 
elimination of dangers which the exercise of reason-
able care would remove or guard against." 
In Instruction No. 22 the court gives in a long instruc-
tion, not entirely verbatim but wholly in substance and ef-
fect, the matters contained in plaintiff's requested Instruc-
tion No. 6 with respect to matters which they may consider 
in determining the amount of damages to a"Yard to plain-
tiff if they find that he is entitled to damages. 
We invite a comparison of matters contained in these 
instructions with the statement given -in appellant's brief 
on page 73 as already herein quoted, and from such com-
parison it will be seen that the plaintiff's theory was very 
definitely and adequately covered by the instructions as 
given. It is true that not all of the instructions followed 
each other in consecutive sequence. This would be im-
possible, and in the giving of instructions as was done here, 
the court interspersed general instructions throughout the 
whole group of instructions with those which may .have 
referred particularly to some specific point. For instance, 
after Instruction No. 2 which set forth the basis of plain-
tiff's claim, Instructions 3 to 5 were general instructions ; 
Instruction 6 sought to disabuse the minds of the' jury as to 
any ideas they may have had on the laws of negligence; In-
struction No. 7 then defined negligence ; then followed In-
structions 8 and 9 which added more to the theory of plain-
tiff's case. Plaintiff will argue that Instructions 10 and ll 
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were favorable to defendant; Instruction 12 could not be so 
considered; and Instructions 13 and 14 again were general. 
Thus it will be seen that it cannot be contended by plain-
tiff that any instructions which may have set forth any of 
defendant's theories on the case were given in any more 
of a consecutive manner than were those applying to defend-
ant's phase of the case. And here we will ask, are defend-
ant and the court to be charged with error because of the 
fact that the defendant submitted more requests in an effort 
to assist the court in preparing the instructions than were 
submitted by plaintiff? Regardless of what conclusion may 
be made upon that question, it is a fact that when the in-
structions are read as a whole the pla~ntiff's theory is pre-
sented as adequately and directly as is any theory on behalf 
of the defendant, and plaintiff's theory is presented as ade-
quately as was warranted by any proper requests made by 
plaintiff. Considering these facts, plus the fact that In-
structions No. 4 and No. 5 would not have been proper in 
any respect without some changes, and considering the 
further fact that the substance of Instructions 4 and 5 
which was not objectionable was included by the court in 
the instructions as given, we confidently state that the 
jury was not in any way misled, and furthermore we are 
absolutely certain that appellant's counsel were not hamper-
ed in any way but were given a free rein in presenting any 
argument which might be available to them and in calling 
the jury's attention to any inference which may have been 
available. Appellant's Point II and statements of error as 
numbered 1 and 2 should be decided adversely to appellant. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR .A. T THE SECOND TRIAL IN INSTRUC-
TION NO. 10 BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
THAT "* * * the mere happening. of the ac-
cident to plaintiff is no proof of negligence on the 
part of either the plaintiff or defendant or evidence 
of same." (Appellant's Statement of Points 4). 
The entire argument of appellant under this Point III 
is unavailing and appellant cannot charge error on the part 
of the court with respect thereto because plaintiff did not 
except to Instruction No. 10 in any manner that would make 
the argument he has asserted here proper or in any manner 
by which he could charge the court ·with error as he has 
done in his statement of error No. 4 and his argument 
under Point III. 
Mr. Dwight King, one of the counsel for plaintiff, in 
taking exceptions to the court's instructions, merely said 
with respect to Instruction No. 10 that plaintiff "excepts 
to the court's Instruction No. 10 for the reason that said 
instruction and the whole of said instruction unduly em-
phasizes and is repetitious of the court's Instruction No. 
7, subsection (c) , which defines the meaning of the word 
'negligence' and also defines 'burden of proof' and 'pro-
ponderance of the evidence,' together with 'proximate 
cause'." Thus the only exception taken was general, on the 
basis that it was repetitious of Instruction No. 7 giving cer-
tain general definitions. 
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·Instruction No. 10 consists of. three sentences. The 
particular part complained of by appellant was contained 
in the first sentence. If plaintiff objected to that, he should 
have objected specifically to it and pointed out such ob-
jectionable matter to the court. The matter was easily 
separable and the two sentences following cannot be ques-
tioned as good law even though the last one may be some-
what repetitious-not of Instruction No. 7 as charged-but 
of other matters following in later instructions. 
In a rather early case this court made a definite ruling 
upon the taking of such exceptions and has uniformly ad-
hered to the rule ever since. In Farnsworth v. Union Pacific 
Coal Co., 32 Utah 112, 89 P. 74, this court said: 
"It is no longer an open question in this court, 
as it has often been held in common with most 
courts, that in taking exceptions the portion that 
is excepted to must be pointed out. A mere excep-
tion to an instruction is an exception in solido to the 
whole instruction, and, unless the whole instruction 
is bad the exception is unavailing for the purpose 
of having any particular part reviewed and passed 
upon by this court. * * * It is necessary, how-
ever, in taking exceptions to bring sharply to the 
mind of the trial court the particular part of the 
instruction that is faulty so that it may be corrected. 
* * * It is an easy rna tter to except to a phrase 
or to a sentence or to any number of such phrases or 
sentences and when this is done the matter can be 
intelligently corrected by the trial court." 
This Fa1,.nsworth case has been cited and followed in 
numerous cases decided by this court since that time. 
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Even \\.,here parts of an instruction may be bad, if 
part of the instruction is good, a general exception will not 
be available. Ra.'mpton v. Cole, 52 Utah 35, 172 P. 477: 
"Conceding the instruction under consideration 
to be erroneous in that regard, yet as we have pointed 
out the first paragraph was proper and correctly 
stated the law. The exception taken was taken to 
the instruction as a whole, and therefore, for that 
reason was insufficient and must be disregarded." 
In McLaughlin v. Chief Consolidated Mining Co., et al., 
62 Utah 532, 220 P. 726, the court said: 
"The exception taken was to the instruction as 
a whole. 
"'It is a rule too well established to be the sub-
ject of controversy that such an exception cannot 
be sustained if any part of the instruction is good.' 
Hansen v. 0. S. L. R. R. Co., 55 Utah, 577, 188 Pac. 
852. 
* * * * * 
"The first part of the instruction stated in a 
separate se~tence, closing with a period, is clearly 
severable from the remainder, and states a correct 
rule of law, * * * 
"It is apparent that appellant's exception was 
not properly taken, and that, although part of the 
instruction be erroneous, it is not a proper subject 
for review by this court. 
"The purpose of an exception to an instruction 
is to call the attention of the trial court to the par-
ticular part of the instruction claimed to be faulty. 
* * * 
"* * * 'It is an easy matter to except to a 
phrase, or to a sentence, or to any number of such 
phrases or sentences, and, when this is done, the 
matter can be intelligently corrected by the trial 
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court, and, if not corrected, may likewise be intelli-
gently reviewed by this court. Without this no in-
telligent review can be made, nor is the lower court 
advised just to what part of the instruction the ex-
ception refers, nor does this court, until argument 
is made upon it. Moreover, it is not ,a review at all 
of the lower court's act, since it was not brought 
to its attention at the trial'." 
This rule is seen to be specifically and directly applic-
able in this case because with respect to Instruction No. 19 
as given by the court, when plaintiff's counsel made their 
exceptions thereto, the court corrected the error, if any 
therein, recalled the jury, told them to disregard Instruction 
No. 19 as he had given it to them, and gave them a new 
Instruction No. 19 from which had been eliminated matters 
to which plaintiff's counsel had objected (R. 236-2). 
In the early case of Wilson v. Sioux Consolidated Min-
ing Co., 16 Utah 392, 52 P. 626, this court stated: 
"Errors relating to the instructions of the court 
were also assigned, but, in the absence of proper ex-
ceptions, we cannot consider them. 'An exception, 
to be of avail in an appellate court, should, in a case 
where any portion of the charge is correct, be strictly 
confined to the objectionable matter, and the judge's 
attention called thereto at the time of the delivery 
of the charge, so that an opportunity may be af-
forded him to make a correction'." 
In the case of Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Smart 
Land & Livestock Co., 43 Utah 554, 137 P. 837, the court 
said: 
"* * * The reason for the rule is obvious. 
When the trial court charges the jury, any defect or 
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omission or misstatement of the law should be clear-
ly pointed out to that court, so that it may be cor-
rected before the jury has passed on the case. Where 
it is contended, therefore, that only a portion of a 
paragraph is faulty, the particular portion must be 
pointed out in the trial court by the party excepting, 
so that the court may know just what is excepted to. 
If this be not done, the trial court has no means of 
knowing to what point or matter or thing the ex-
ception is directed, and hence is unable to supply an 
omission or to correct an incorrect statement of the 
law. The rule is intended to aid the trial courts in 
correcting erroneous statements of the law, and in 
supplying omissions in the instructions, and if strict-
ly enforced will tend to correct many errors that 
other,vise would go undetected. *· * *" 
In the case of Dimraick v. Utah Fuel Co., 49 Utah 430, 
164 P. 872, the court said: 
"The only exception taken at the trial by the 
appellants to the foregoing instruction was to that 
portion wherein the court told the jury that 'the 
risks that are assumed by an employee * * * 
are those that * * * appear to threaten im-
mediate injury to such employee.' Appellants' coun-
sel, in their brief, contend that the instruction was 
erroneous and prejudicial in other particulars, but 
we find no exceptions were taken in the court below 
to such other portions of the instruction now com-
plained of, and therefore this court cannot here for 
the first time consider them as grounds for reversal. 
* * *" 
In Mehr v. Child et al., 90 Utah 348, 61 P. (2d) 624, the 
court said: 
"In any event, the whole instruction is not bad, 
appellants having confined their objections to the 
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whole instruction which is divisible into integral 
parts. They are not entitled to p-revail on their as-
signment with respect to that instruction. When an 
instruction is divisible into integral parts and any 
one or more of the integral parts is not open to ob-
jection, then, and in such case, an objection to the 
whole must fail." 
In the concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in the case 
of Fowler v. Medical Arts Bldg. 112 Utah 367, 188 P. (2d) 
711, the rule was recognized and stated as follows: 
"* * * It is well settled in this jurisdiction 
that where an exception is taken to the whole of an 
instruction, the exception will not be sustained 
unless the whole instruction is bad. If the instruc-
tion is partially correct and partially erroneous, the 
erroneous part of the instruction must be pointed out 
by the party taking exception thereto. Since the ex-
ception was to the whole of the instruction and only a 
part, if any, of the instruction was erroneous, it fol-
lows that the assignment of error cannot be sustain-
d * * *" e . 
See also: 
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P .. (2d) 
654. 
Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, 3d Ed., 
Vol. 1, Sec. 17 4, p. 464. 
Ryan v. Beaver County, 82 Utah 27, 21 P. (2d) 
858. 
Respondent does not waive its right to insist that such 
error cannot be charged because of failure on the part of 
plaintiff to properly except thereto, but without waiving 
such right and in spite of continuing our insistence that the 
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matter 'vas not properly preserved for argument before this 
court by proper exceptions, respondent nevertheless insists 
that Instruction No. 10, including that particular part now 
attacked by appellant, was proper. 
Appellant on page 45 of his brief quotes from 38 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, Sec. 290, p. 985. Counsel fail to quote the 
general statement given at the beginning of that Sec. 290, 
p. 983, wherein it is stated: 
"* * * Negligence, however, is a fault, and 
is not to be presumed, but rather must be proved. 
Apart from tke rule of res ipsa loquitur, negligence 
cannot be assumed from the mere fact of an accident 
and an injury. The mere fact that an accident hap-
pens is not evidence of negligence. (Italics ours.) 
* * *" 
The cases cited in the footnote statements quoted by 
counsel on page 45 are res ipsa loquitur cases, or rather the 
Michigan case is a res ipsa loquitur case and the Massa-
chusetts case is one involving a defective coupler, which 
is similar to a res ipsa loquitur case, and now in effect made 
such by the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Likewise some 
of the cases cited by counsel, if not the majority of cases 
supporting any such position for which they contend, are res 
ipsa loquitor cases or cases with peculiar facts similar to 
res ipsa loquitur cases. 
In res ipsa loquitur cases, the mere fact of the accident 
does not raise an inference of negligence, but where in 
addition to the fact of the happening of the accident it is 
shown that the instrumentality causing the injury is under 
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the exclusive control of the defendant charged with negli-
gence, and where it also appears that the very nature of 
the accident is such that it does not ordinarily happen un-
less the person in charge of such instrumentality is negligent, 
then, and only when such circumstances appear, negligence 
can be inferred. That is not true in the case at bar. Counsel 
misconstrue the fact of the accident or injury with the 
circumstances surrounding the injury and how the accident 
and injury happened. That is something more than and in 
addition to the mere fact of accident. Such a view includes 
all surrounding circumstances which go to show why the 
accident happened. Such matters are evidentiary matters 
and are proper in an attempt to prove negligence. How-
ever, the mere fact that Williams fell and broke his leg 
does not say that he, the railroad, or anyone else was negli-
gent. 
Counsel on page 4 7 of their brief state that "The slip-
ping and falling on the switch ties * * *" was proper 
proof of negligence on behalf of the defendant in failing to 
furnish a safe place to work. "The slipping and falling on 
· the switch ties." is something more and in addition to the 
mere fact of the accident. Those are evidentiary facts sur-
rounding the accident, showing how and why it happened, 
not merely that it happened. Counsel add: "yet this event 
and occurrence was removed from jury consideration." Such 
a statement is absurd and counsel know better and know 
that not only was it not removed from the jury's considera-
tion, but counsel developed fully the circumstances sur-
rounding the happening of the accident and developed in 
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detail how the accident occurred according to plaintiff's 
theory. The happening of an accident is one thing; the facts 
surrounding it, giving evidence as to how and why it hap-
pened, are another ; and counsel should distinguish between 
the two. 
In the case of Le~vis v. Davis, 59 Utah 85, 201 P. 861, 
the nature of the accident itself was something tending to 
show negligence. In fact, the court concluded that the ex-
plosion would not have occurred had the carbide gas gener-
ator been properly handled. The Le~vis case is really a res 
ipsa loquitur case. There was no eyewitness to the accident 
and Lewis was dead. He was dead as a result of an explosion, 
and the court concluded the explosion would not have hap-
pened if the railroad company, which had charge of the 
carbide gas generator, had maintained it properly. It was 
the type of an accident- which would not have occurred ex-
cept for negligence on the part of someone having control 
of it. 
Counsel cite and quote at length from the case of Orris 
v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry Co., 214 S. W. 125. It is interesting 
to note with respect to this case that the publishers in setting 
out the syllabus give as Syllabus 2 : "The mere fact of in-
jury standing alone is no proof of negligence," and the 
court admits in that case that such had been the holding 
theretofore. The court then says that the cases do not say 
that the character of the injury inflicted may not be a circum-
stance tending to show negligence, or a fact from which, 
when coupled with other facts, negligence may not be in-
ferred. One of the judges in a dissenting opinion in the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
54 
Orr.is case accuses the court of having departed from the 
rule theretofore followed in Missouri, and states: 
"* * * Injury and suit of themselves, or per 
se, do not warrant an inference of negligence in cases 
where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no appli-
cation. Such has been the uniform ruling of this 
court. Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. loc. cit. 74, 18 S. W. 
1149. In such cases the plaintiff must do three things 
in order to discharge the burden of proving the negli-
gence charged : First, show an injury; second, negli-
gence on the part of the defendant; and, third, a cau-
sal connecti_on between the negligence and the injury. 
In taking these steps· no inference of negligence 
arises from proof of the naked fact' of injury, and if 
the plaintiff stops there no recovery can be had. 
But the plaintiff must go further and establish negli- 11111111111 
gence · from other facts and circumstances. Having 
done that, and having also shown the efficiency of 
the negligence in causing the injury, a case is then 
(and not until then) made for the jury, * * *" 
We would like to point out to the court and counsel 
that the Orris case is not considered law in the State of 
Missouri now. 
In the case of Nicholson v. Franciscus et al., 40 S. W. 
(2d) 623, an instruction had been given as follows: 
"The court instructs the jury that the plaintiff 
is not entitled to recover in this case merely because 
she may have been injured while working for the 
defendants." 
After a jury verdict for defendants, plaintiff appealed 
charging error and citing the Orris case. The Supreme 
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Court of Missouri refused to follow the Orris case and 
sustained the trial court's judgment, saying: 
"* * * Ordinarily, it is not error to tell 
the jury that the mere fact that plaintiff was in-
jured does not necessarily create liability or war-
rant an inference of defendant's negligence. The 
rulings in the Orris Case and the cases following it 
are based upon a distinction between cases wherein 
the character of the injury is of itself a material 
link in the chain of circumstance·s tending to show 
negligence, and cases where the injury is not of 
such a character. Sharp v. City of ~c:arthage, 319 
Mo. 1028, 5 S. W. (2d) 6. The rule laid down in 
the Orris Case is followed and applied' by the 
courts only in that class of cases wherein the 
peculiar characteristics of the injury itself may be 
a link in the chain of circumstances tending to 
prove the negligence alleged in the petition. Man-
they v. Kellerman ·Contracting Co., 311 Mo. 147, 
277 S. W. 927; Sharp v. City of Carthage, supra; 
Schmeer v. Anchor Cold Storage Co. (Mo. Sup.) 
12 S. \V. (2d) 433, 436; Moss v. Wells (Mo. Sup.) 
249 S. W. 411. In the instant case, there is nothing 
in the character of the injury sustained by plain-
tiff tending to show negligence on the part of de-
fendants. * * *" 
With this and other cases, the Missouri court has limited 
the rule as announced in the Orris case to the peculiar facts 
of the case. At first, it seemed to limit the ruling of the case 
to res ipsa loquitur cases, but later the Missouri court ap-
proved such an instruction even in res ipsa loquitur cases. 
In the case of Palmer v. Hygrade Water & Soda Co., 
(Mo.) 151 S. W. (2d) 548, the trial court had granted a 
new trial after a verdict for the defendant upon the basis 
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that it thought it had erred in giving an instruction number-
ed as Instruction No. 9, but the Missouri Appellate Court 
reversed the trial court and reinstated the original judgment 
and approved the giving of an instruction that the happen-
ing of an accident is no evidence of negligence. We quote 
the following from that opinion: 
"The gist of the criticized instruction,· when 
stripped of explanatory words, was to the effect 
that the mere fact that plaintiff was injured and 
has brought suit is no evidence of defendant's negli-
gence or liability unless plaintiff has established 
the negligence of defendant by a preponderance of 
the evidence as described in the other instructions. 
* * * 
"There are cases where the nature and character 
of the wound inflicted, the injury, has a material 
bearing on the question of negligence, and such was 
the case of Orris v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Railway Co., 
·, 279 lVfo. 1, 214 S. W. 124, * * * And for that 
reason an instruction in the Orris case, practically 
the same as defendant's instruction No. 9 in this 
case, was held to be erroneous; however, such ruling 
was limited to the facts in that case, and the Supreme 
Court in the later case of Nicholson v. Franciscus, 
328 Mo. 96, 40 S. W. 2d 623, 625, in approving a 
similar instruction, distinguished the Orris case 
from that case in these words: 'The rule laid down 
in the Orris case is followed and applied by the 
courts only in that class of cases wherein the peculiar 
characteristics of the injury itself may be a link in 
the chain of circumstances tending to prove the 
negligence alleged in the petition." 
The Missouri court went on to state in the Palmer case: 
"In the case of Barraclough v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., 331 Mo. 157, 52 S. W. 2d 998, an instruction, 
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almost identical with defendant's instruction No. 9 
in this case, was approved. Similar instructions were 
approved in Hicks v. Vieths, Mo. Sup., 46 S. W. 2d 
604, and Gardner v. Turk, 343 Mo. 899, 123 S. W. 
2d 158. These cited cases were not brought on the 
theory of res ipsa loquitur; however, the fact that 
this case is brought under that doctrine could not 
deprive the defendant of its right to this instruction. 
The rule as to such instruction is the same in a res 
ipsa case as an ordinary negligence case. 
"In the case of Sakowski v. Baird, 334 Mo. 951, 
69 S. W. 2d 649, which is referred to as a typical res 
ipsa case, the trial court set aside a verdict for the 
defendant on the ground that it had committed er-
ror in giving an instruction as follows: 'The Court 
instructs the jury that although you believe and find 
from the evidence that the plaintiff in this case was 
injured, this fact alone, regardless of how serious 
such injuries to her person may be, will not warrant 
you in finding in favor of the plaintiff for any sum 
unless you further find and believe from the evi-
dence that the defendant was negligent and that 
such negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of 
such injury, if any.' 
''The Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
the cause with directions to set aside the order grant-
ing a new trial, reinstate the verdict, overrule the 
motion for a new trial, and enter judgment on the 
verdict. And in the course of the opinion the Su-
preme Court, with reference to this instruction, 
said: 'It merely states an essential requirement to 
recovery in every case founded upon negligence 
whether it be a res ipsa or ordinary negligence case'." 
In the case of Boyd v~ San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 
45 Utah 449, 146 P. 282, this court had a problem before 
it similar to the one before it now. In that case a proper 
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exception had not been taken. We quote the following from 
the opinion : 
"An exception was taken to that portion itali-
cized. The alleged error here pointed out and argued 
is not that, but to the first part of the paragraph, 
where the court stated that: 
"'The mere fact that an accident has happened 
is not sufficient proof to charge the defendant with 
negligence or the plaintiff (deceased) with contri-
butory negligence.' 
"What is urged against it is that by the use of 
the word 'sufficient' the thought is implied that the 
happening of the accident was some evidence to 
show negligence on the part of the defendant. It is 
enough to say that that portion was not excepted to 
nor the court's attention directed to it by the excep-
tion. Then there is no substance to the argument. The 
fair meani:ng of the charge is that negligence of 
neither party is to be inferred from the mere hap-
pening of the accident. The argument, however, 
makes the charge as strong against the plaintiff as 
the defendant. The defendant cannot maintain that 
by the charge . the jury understood that the happen-
ing of the accident was some ev~dence to show the 
defendant's. negligence but not to show contributory 
negligence. The court said it was not sufficient to 
show either. That certainly does not imply that it 
is some evidence to show the defendant's negligence 
but not contributory negligence." 
In Major v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 21 Utah 141, 59 
P. 522, this court held: 
"* * * And the mere proof that an injury 
was received on a train or vehicle is not sufficient 
to raise the presumption of negligence. It must be 
further shown that there was some defect in ap-
pliances, or in the manner of their use. * * *" 
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In Wells v. Utah Constr·uctio·n Co., 27 Utah 524, 76 P. \ 
560, the defendant requested an instruction containing the 
following: ··You are further charged that the mere fact 
that the accident has happened is not sufficient proof to 
charge the defendant with negligence." The instruction also 
contained matter on burden of proof and weight of evi-
dence. For refusing such instruction this court reversed 
the trial court, saying : 
'"* * * The instruction requested by the de-
fendant was correct in all of its parts, and the trial 
court therefore erred in omitting any part of the 
same in the instructions given to the jury." 
In the case of Moser v. Zion's Coop. Mere. Institution, 
Utah . __ , 197 P. 2d 136, this court in affirming the .. 
trial court, held the following instruction not to be error : 
I 
"You are instructed that the mere fact that an 
accident happened, or that plaintiff was injured, 
constitutes no proof of negligence against the de-
fendants." 
Cases from other jurisdictions approving such an 
instruction are numerous. Without quoting further we will 
merely refer to the following: 
McKinney v. Public Service Interstate Transp. 
Co., (N. J.) 72 A. (2d) 326. 
Briscoe v. Pacific Elec·tric Railway Co., (Cal.) 
200 P. (2d) 875. 
Snyder v. MeDowell, (Kan.) 203 P. (2d) 2.25. 
Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. Co. v. Wickliffe, 
(Okla.) 202 P. (2d) 423. 
Lakey v. McAlester Coal Co., (Okla.) 224 P. 
309. 
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Stanalo.nis v. Branch Motor Express Co., (Pa.) 
57 A. (2d) 866. 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Pere Marquette 
R. Co., (Mich.) 34 N. W. (2d) 46. 
Vaughn v. Huff, (Va.) 41 S. E. (2d) 482. 
Miller v. Cranston, (Cal.) 106 P. ( 2d) 9·63. 
Amarillo Coc·a-Cola Bottling Co. v. Loudder , 
(Texas) 207 S. W. (2d) 632. 
Pacific Coast R. Co. v. American Mail Line 
' (Wash.) 172 P. (2d) 226. 
Goff v. City Lines of W .. Va., 43 S. E. (2d) 800. 
Tamagno v. Conley, (Mass.) 76 N. E. (2d) 637. 
Swans·on v. Progress Electric Co., 3·9 Ill. App. 
188, 67 N. E. (2d) 426. 
Halliday v. Raymond, (Neb.) 22 N. W. (2d) 
614. 
Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies Co., (Kan.) 185 P. 
(2d) 158. 
Respondent respectfully submits not only was it not 
error for the court to instruct the jury as he did in Instruc-
tion No. 10, but the failure of plaintiff to except to said in~ 
struction, and specifically the failure to except to that por-
tion now attacked by appellant, precludes a·ppellant from 
urging error on that basis in this court. 
" 
P'OINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT, AT' T:HE SEIC·O·ND TRIAL, 
DID NOT' ERR BY GIVING INSTRU·CTION NO. 
12, N'OR DID THE C·OURT· BY SUCH INSTRUC-
TION REVIVE THE DOCT.RINE OF CONTRIB-
UT'ORY NE·G,LIGENCE AS A COMPL.E:TE BAR 
T'O RECOVERY. (Statement of Points 6.) 
In Instruction No. 12 the court attempted to point out 
to the jury which of the respective parties had the burden 
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of proof with repect to the issues of neglig·ence on the part 
of defenqant or contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff, and by objecting as appellant has done to the 
instruction in question, we must again charge appellant 
with quibbling over mere 'vords. Counsel for appellant 
assume the position in their argument under Point No. IV 
that the 'vord "defense" can mean nothing in any instance 
except a . complete bar. There is nothing to indicate that 
the jury would so consider it, nor is there even anything 
in the record nor in appellant's argument to indicate that 
an average attorney or court dealing with technical lan-
guage day-by-day "\Vould so assume that the use of the 
word defense would mean a complete bar. Appellant gives 
Webster's Dictionary definition of defense as, "An oppos-
ing or denial of the truth or validity of the plaintiff's case," 
and then adds: "Contributory negligence is only material 
as bearing on the issue o_f damages." We think it could as_ 
consistently be said that in as much as contributory negli-
gence is material in an F.E.L.A. case as bearing on the 
issue of damages, it is therefore a defense pro tanto. It is~ 
interesting to note that Section 53 of U.S.C.A. as quoted 
by counsel does not say that contributory negligence shall 
not be a defense, but says that "contributory negligence 
shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be dimin-
ished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to such employee * * *" Must we assume 
without anything more than this record shows that a jury 
of laymen would conclude by the use of the words "defense 
of contributory negligence," as us-ed by the court, that the 
court intended to indicate that such would be a complete 
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bar? The mere stating of such a question shows that the 
obvious answer would be a. denial. The court specifically 
instructed the jury in Instruction No. 6 that if they had 
ever had any experinece in any other negligence case that 
they "should wholly disregard any and all conceptions which 
you may have had with respect to the law of negligence" as 
gained by such prior experience, and the court told them: 
"You are to be guided solely and wholly by these instruc-
tions, and you must wholly disregard your own conception 
of what the law is or ought to be in this case." 
If we are to indulge in any assumption upon the mat-
ter, we should assume as was stated by this court in Ryan 
v. Beaver County, 82 Utah .27, 21 P. (2d) 858: 
"The jury is bound on questions of law to yield 
full obedience to instructions of the court, and this 
applies as well to that part of the charge defining 
the issues, as made by the pleadings, as to the law as 
declared by the court and made applicable to the 
evidence as submitted." 
Counsel go on under their Point IV to cite cases to the 
effect that conflicting instructions should not be given. 
We admit to be good la.w the rule that it is error to give 
conflicting instructions where such instructions, when con-
sidered together with other instructions, cannot be recon-
ciled. But that is not the question here. In order to show 
the extent to which counsel for appellant have gone to quib-
ble over words, we would like to ca11 attention to other in-
structions given by the court. Following Instruction No. 
12, the court gave Instructions No. 13 and No. 14, in which 
he tried to explain the meaning of the term negligence, 
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which broadens to some extent the definitions given of neg-
ligence and ordinary care in paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
Instruction No. 7. In none of these was the jury told what 
their duty would be if they found the plaintiff to be con-
tributorily negligent, nor were they in any respect advised 
as to their responsibilities if they determined that the "de-
fense" of contributory negligence had been established. In 
\ 
Instruction No. 21, however, the court did tell the jury that 
if they found that the plaintiff failed to exercise that de-
gree of care that an ordinary reasonably prudent person 
'vould have done, and if they found "that such failure on 
the part of the plaintiff proximately contributed to cause 
plaintiff's injury, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
recover full damages,~ but only a diminished sum bearing 
the same relation to the full damages that the negligence 
attributable to the defendant bears to the negligence at-
tributable to both parties, the purpose being to exclude 
from the recovery a proportional part of the damages cor-
responding to the plaintiff's contribution to the total negli-
gence." 
The plaintiff took no exception whatsoever to the 
court's manner of thus telling the jury in Instruction No. 
21 what they should do if they found that contributory neg-
ligence had been established. Instruction No. 21 is~ not con-
flicting nor contradictory of Instruction No. 12, but merely 
explains No. 12 and tells the jury what they should do 'if 
they find contributo.ry negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff. Instruction 21 would have been sufficient to obviate 
any question with respect to Instruction No. 12 had nothing 
further been said with respect thereto, but the court did 
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not leave it at that. In Instruction No. 23 the court went 
on to state: "If you should find that it is just as probable 
that plaintiff was free from negligence, or even if negligent, 
that his negligence did not contribute as a proximate cause 
of the injury, as it is that negligence on the plaintiff's part 
did contribute as a proximate cause, then the defense of 
contributory negligence has not been established." The 
same wording of "defense of contributory negligence" is 
thus used in Instruction N·o. 23, but counsel for appellant 
artfully evade quoting that portion of Instruction No. 23 
where they quote Instructions 21 and 23 on page 32· of their 
brief. The last paragraph of Instruction 23 following im-
mediately the wording just giveri, "then the defense of 
contributory negligence has not been established," reads, 
"You are further instructed in this case that if you find 
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, you can only 
consider that in mitigating the damages, or, in other words, 
if the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, you are 
to determine the portion of the amount of damages he has 
sustained that he is to bear himself." 
We repeat that there is nothing in the record to indi-
cate that ordinary laymen sitting on a jury would assume 
that the use of the words "defense of contributory negli-
gence" as used by the court would mean to such laymen 
that they should consider such contributory negligence as 
a complete bar. 
The decided cases· are not by any means all in accord 
with counsel's attitude in this case that the word defense 
must mean a complete bar. 
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In Aetna Life Insura.nce Co. v. Brockman, 70 F. (2d) 
647, the Federal Circuit c·ourt of Appeals, in a case arising 
in Colorado, quoted and followed the case of Whitfield v. 
Aetna Life Insurance Co., 205 U. S. 489·, wherein it was 
said: 
"* * * Whatever tends to diminish the 
plaintiff's cause of action or to ·defeat recovery in 
whole or in part amounts in law to a defense * * *" 
(Italics ours.) 
In lFaterford Lumber Co. v. Jacobs, (Miss.) 97 S. 187, 
the court said: 
"A defense to a cause of action is any fact or 
state of facts which will defeat it in whole or in 
part, or, in other words, any matter which tends 
to diminish the amount of recovery or to entirely 
defeat the cause of action." 
In Scott v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District, 
(N. D.) 107 N. W. 61, the court said: 
"A defense is any fact or state of facts which 
will defeat in whole or in part a cause of action. 2 
Words & Phrases, p. 1939." 
We think that the case of McM'aster v. Salt Lake 
Transp. Co., 108 Utah 207, 159 P. (2d) 121, decided by this 
court, is a complete answer to appellant's argument under 
Point IV. That case involved injury to a passenger riding 
in a taxicab operated by a ~ompany considered to be a com-
mon carrier. Admittedly the duty owed by the taxicab com-
pany to the passenger was a duty to exercise the highest 
degree of care. It was contended on appeal that the trial 
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court erred because in one of the instructions it gave a 
definition of "ordinary care," and it was argued that there-
by the jury was allowed to believe that "ordina;ry care" was 
all that was required of the defendant. In affirming the 
trial court this court stated : 
"* * * The duty imposed upon the defend-
ant by law was to use the utmost care to transport 
the plaintiff safely. * * * Therefore, an in-
struction defining 'ordinary care' could have been 
of no possible aid to the jury. * * * Yet in view 
of the other instructions given, we do not think that 
the jury could have been misled in this regard. 
"The jury was told in instruction number 8 that 
the law imposes on the defendant taxicab company 
the duty to exercise the highest degree of care. In-
struction number 10 told the jury that: 'While such 
relationship (of public taxicab carrier and passen-
ger) exists, the law imposes the duty upon a taxicab 
carrier of exercising the highest degree of care to 
protect its passengers against accidents'." 
The court then concluded: 
"In view of the instructions telling the jury that 
the defendant owed the highest degree of care to 
transport the plaintiff safely * * * it is not 
likely that the jury was at all misled or confused 
by the giving of a definition of ordinary care. 
* * *" 
The court concluded its opinion stating: 
"* * * The granting or denying of a motion 
for a new trial rests largely in the discretion of the 
trial court. There is nothing in the record on appeal 
to indicate that this discretion was abused in this 
case.'' 
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The use of the \vords "defense of contributory negli-
gence" as complained of by appellant herein would not be 
as serious as a definition of ordinary care in a case where 
something in addition to ordinary care was required be-
cause we cannot assume that a j'ury would have in mind 
counsel's opinion that the word defense meant a complete 
'bar, particularly in view of the fact that the court, in the 
other instructions referred to, specifically told· the jury 
what they should do '"if the defense of contributory negli-
gence" was established and if they so found, that it should 
only be considered in mitigation or by way of diminishing 
damages that plaintiff might otherwise be entitled to. 
We respectfully submit that the court did not err in 
giving Instruction No. 12. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL ·COURT AT THE SECOND TRIAL 
DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRU·CTION NO. 
19, NOR DID HE T~HEREBY REVIVE T1HE DOC-
TRINES OF CONTRIBUT·ORY NEGLIGENCE 
AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK. (Statement of 
Point 7.) 
Without repeating the cas·es which we have heretofore 
cited in this brief in connection with our argument under 
appellant's Point III, we wish to point out to the court 
that any claimed error resulting from the giving of Instruc-
tion No. 19 is not properly before this court for review be-
cause the plaintiff and appellant failed to take any excep-
tion whatsoever to said Instruction No. 19 as given. We 
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respectfully refer the court to the cases heretofore cited 
in connection with our argument under appellant's Point 
III and to the law as therein set forth. 
When the court upon the second trial in this case con-
cluded his instructions to the jury and before argument to 
the jury he asked counsel for both parties if they had ob-
served any error of an elemental nature that they wanted 
to call to the court's attention and both counsel said they 
had none ( R. 229-2) . 
After the argument to the jury and after_ the jury had 
retired to deliberate, formal exceptions were then taken 
and· among others the defendant did take an exception to 
the court's instruction No. 19 as given. The exception as 
taken was mainly of a general nature but plaintiff's counsel 
added "and plaintiff excepts particularly to the words 'and 
any voluntary departure from the path of safety will pre-
vent his recovery for his injury.'" (R. 232-2). The instruc-
tion as the court had theretofore given it was verbatim with 
the instruction as given on the first trial o:f the case and 
upon the plaintiff thus taking exception the court had some 
discussion with counsel and the court concluded that it 
would be necessary for him to change and reframe the 
instruction. The court thereupon recalled the jury and 
re-instructed them in connection therewith as follows: 
"Gentlemen of the jury, since you retired from the court-
room the court has concluded to withdraw from your con-
sideration what he read as Instruction No. 19 and to sub-
stitute what I am about to read as Instruction No. 19·" (R. 
236--2). The court then gave Instruction No. 19 as is set 
forth on page 62 of appellant's brief, which instruction had 
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been reframed and from which was entirely . deleted the 
words "any voluntary departure from the path of safety 
will prevent his recovery for his injury," as theretofore ex-
cepted to by plaintiff's counsel. The substituted Instruc-
tion No. 19 as thus given by the court was agreed. to by. 
plaintiff's counsel and after the g·iving of such substituted 
instruction PLAINTIFF. MADE NO OBJECTION OR EX-
CEPTION THERETO WHATSOEVER, in spite of the fact 
that counsel for defendant did except because by the chang-
ing of such instruction the court had not given defendant's 
Instruction No. 10 as requested. T'he change thus made 
by the court was made at the request of counsel for plain-
tiff, was agreed to by counsel for plaintiff, and after the 
giving of the substituted instruction no objection or excep-
tion was taken by plaintiff and plaintiff cannot be heard 
to complain in this court that the trial court committed error 
in the giving of such instruction. 
WE DO NOT WIS.H TO WAIVE OUR RIGHT ·TO 
INSIST THAT PLAINTIFF'S F AlLURE TO EX·CEPT 
TO SUCH INSTRUCTION PRECLUDES HIM FR·OM 
CHARGING ERROR. HEREIN, BUT ASIDE FROM T'HAT 
FACT WE STRENUOUSLY INSIST THAT THE C·OURT 
DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN THE GIVING OF SAID 
INSTRU·CT'ION NO. 19. 
Appellant starts from a false premise and argues 
throughout on this point, not upon the question as to 
whether the plaintiff had a safe and an unsafe place or · 
way in which he could do his work with a safe place amply 
available to him, but appellant argues upon the premise 
that plaintiff had been assigned to work in an unsafe place 
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and then argues that by the court instructing· the jury on 
\ 
contributory negligence the court had revived the doctrine 
of assumption of risk. Appellant states on page 62 of his 
brief that. "plaintiff owed no duty to exercise reasonable 
and ordinary care to discover and use a safe way of throw-
ing the switch, even assuming that there was a safe and 
a dangerous way available to him. HE SIMPLY OWED 
THE DUTY OF CONDU·CTJNG HIMSEL1F A.S A REAS-
ONABLY PRUDENT PERS.ON UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANiCES." Thus appellant admits that plaintiff did owe 
the duty of conducting himself as a reasonably prudent 
person under the circumstances and IN INSTRUCT'ION 
NO. 19· T'HE COURT TOLD THE JURY NOTHIN'G MORE 
T'HAN THAT PL.AINT'IF'F SHOUL.D ACT AS A REA-
SONABLY PRUDENT PERSON WOULD HAVE DONE 
UNDER THE CIRCUMST.AN·CES. Appellant further states 
at the top of page 63, of his brief, "If he negligently chose 
a dangerous way when a safe way were available to him, 
that could amount to nothing more than contributory negli-
gence on his part * * * ." There was no attempt on the 
part of either court or counsel to say that the failure to 
· use a safe way rather than a dangerous way was other 
than negligence. However, that negligence may have been 
either contributory negligence or the jury may have found 
that such negligence was the sole negligence in the case. 
The facts· of this case did not compel a finding of n~gli­
gence on the part of the defendant but it was left for the 
jury to decide whether, under the circumstances, either 
plaintiff or defendant or both were negligent, and the court 
was required to instruct the jury, upon proper request being 
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made, that they should determine just who was negligent 
~~: and what negligence was the proximate cause of the injury 
~ .. to plaintiff, 'vhether the negligence proximately causing 
~W• plaintiff's injury vvas entirely his "without negligence on 
I: I' 
.. ~·~ the part of the defendant" as set forth in Instruction No. 
17, (against vvhich plaintiff also complains without except-
...... ' ... 
~~~ ing thereto), or 'vhether the negligence was that of defen-
~~~. dant, or both. 
We think in their argument under Point V counsel for 
appellant again unjustly accuse the court and twist the 
· · · language of the instructions in an attempt to do so. On · 
page 65 of their brief counsel say: "It will be noted that 
the court places the burden on plaintiff of discovering at 
his peril, the safer or less dangerous of two available ways 
of performing a duty." Again we are amazed at counsel's 
""" interpretation or understanding of the English language. 
--- Wherein could it be said that the court holds the plaintiff 
to the responsibility of "discovering at his peril." The in-
. · · struction says, "The employe owes a duty to ex~rcise rea-
sonable and ordinary care to discover and use the safe 
way." That does not mean "discovering at his peril", but 
; ; l merely means that the plaintiff should act as an ordinary, 
~ ~ c reasonable man. Later on in the instruction the court di-
rects the jury to find whether "the plaintiff by the exercise 
. . . orf reasonable and ordinary care would have dis·co:vered 
~ ~ ~ such safe way." This again is not charging him to discover 
· · · it at his peril but only to· act as a reasonable ·man. Again 
· · the instruction says, "but nevertheless chose a position. on 
the ties which he as a reasonable and prudent switchman 
. . . should have known were slippery and dangerous." The 
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court does .not say that the plaintiff should act at his peril 
but says· that he is held to the responsibility of acting as a 
reasonable man would have acted and the court repeats 
that measuring stick "as a reasonable and prudent man" 
three times in the instruction and only states. that the plain-
tiff would be guilty of negligence if he did not act as an 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent man. That does not say 
that he must be held to the responsibility of "discovering 
at his peril", but merely states that the plaintiff has the 
responsibility of acting as· an ordinary, reasonable and 
prudent man would have acted under the circumstances. 
AND THAT IS THE LAW, REGAR;DLESS OF HOW 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL MAY SEEK T'O TWIST· THE 
MEANING OF T'HE PLAIN WORDS USED BY THE 
COURT IN T'HE INS.TRUCTIO·N. 
Even in the case of Brady v. Florence & C. C. R. Co., 
(Colo.) 98 P. 321, quoted by counsel on page 64 of their 
brief, the court gives the measuring stick as that of a rea-
sonable man and says t:ha t a person is not negligent if he 
acts as a reasonable man would have acted under the cir-
cumstances, and at the same time inferentially states that 
if the method ·chosen would not have been adopted under 
like circumstances by a reasonable and prudent 1nan, then 
Brady would have been negligent. In the case at bar the 
court did not say that Williams would be guilty of negli-
gence if he failed to use a safer way, but the court did say 
that he was held to act as a reasonable man would have 
acted and that the jury could find that he was negligent if the 
jury should find that as a reasonable man he should have 
determined there was a safer way and if as a reasonable 
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man he should have used the safer way. Such an instruc-
tion was no more favorable to defendant than to plaintiff. 
It merely held plaintiff to the same rule to which other 
instructions held the defendant, and that is, that he· should 
have acted as a reasonable man would have acted under the 
circumstances. 
Appellant refers to the fact that plaintiff said he did 
not know the switch ties were slick and slippery until he 
slipped and fell. Still appellant insists that respondent 
must be charged with the knowledge of the slickness of the 
surrounding area and plaintiff was in a better position to 
know than anyone else, because prior to his accident he 
had already covered the entire area of the three switches 
and manipulated each of the three. 
At the bottom of page 65 and. top of page 66 of his 
brief appellant states: '"If the place of work was unsafe 
the defendant must under the law be charged with violation 
of its duty toward ·plaintiff." By "place of work" ,plaintiff's 
counsel can mean nothing other than the place where pl~in­
tiff did the work and if that is their meaning the statement 
is not correct because the defendant need not .be charged 
with violation of its duty toward plaintiff if the place where 
he did his work was unsafe, if there was a safe place and 
a safer way to do the work and such safe place and safer 
way would have been discovered and used by a reasonable 
man under the circumstances, as referred to in Instruction 
No. 19. 
We call attention to the fact that not only the defen-
dant, but plaintiff requested an instruction which told the 
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jury that the defendant must exercise reasonable care to 
provide its employes· a reasonably safe place to work, and 
that this duty does not require the absolute elimination of 
all d'anger, but only requires the elimination of danger which 
the exercise of reasonable care would remove or guard 
against. The defendant is not an insurer of its employes · 
and the cases are legion holding that an employer is en-
titled to assume that its. employes· will exercise reasonable 
care or that care which an ordinary, reasonably prudent 
employe would exercise. 
Plaintiff's counsel attempt to drag a "red herring" 
across the trail by arguing the doctrine of assumption of 
risk. There is no question of assumption of risk involved 
herein and I am surprised at the efforts of appellant's 
counsel to cloud the issues in. that way. It is similar to their 
attempt to convince the court that "proximate cause" is not 
to be considered in Federal Employers' Liability Act cases. 
Regardless of whether counsel may call it assumption of 
risk, or whatever it is, an employe as well as an employer 
is still bound by law to act as an ordinary, reasonable, 
prudent man, and' heaven help us if the time ever comes 
when it can be· said that employers must act as reasonable 
men but employes need not do so. Requiring an employe 
to act as a reasonable man cannot in any way be consid-
ered as p]acing on him the burden of "assumption of risk." 
On page 66 of appellant's brief counsel state that the 
instruction was the same as saying to the jury, "If plaintiff 
should have discovered the unsafe place of work, but did 
not, and was injured thereby, he assumes the risks assoc-
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iated 'vith the unsafe condition." Counsel are again play-
ing "~ith 'vords. Instruction No. 19 told the jury, in effect, 
that if plaintiff should, as a reasonable man, have discov-
ered that one "'ay of doing the work was unsafe, but a safe 
wav was available, and if a reasonable man would have 
discovered and used the safer way, then the jury could find 
plaintiff negligent for not acting as a reasonable man would 
have done in discovering and using the safe way. That is 
the most that could be stated with respect to the instruc- . 
tion and that is the law, and in two other instructions as 
given by the court the court repeated that negligence on 
plaintiff's part could only be considered in mitigating of 
damages and that his right to damages otherwise, if the 
jury so found, could only be diminished proportionately, 
unless, as the court said in Instruction No. 17, plaintiff's 
injuries were "due to his own negligence without negligence 
on the part of the defendant proximately contributing" 
thereto. 
Not only are appellant's counsel wrong in their logic 
and in their interpretation of the English language, but the 
cases cited by them do not support the propositions asserted 
by them. The case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co., 
318 U. S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 Sup. Ct. 444, as cited and 
quoted at length by appellant's. counsel applies. in cases 
where only one type of place of work is pro:vided ·by an 
employer and that one place of work has certain dangers 
inherent in it and no safer place or safer way of doing the 
work is available or provided which a reasonable employe 
would know that he should use. The Tiller case had no 
question whatsoever involved in it with respect to a choice 
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of places of work or manner of performing the work being 
available to the employe. The case of. Boston & M. R. R. Co. 
v. Cabana, 148 F. (2d) 150, cited and quoted on page 63 of 
, appellant's brief is a case similar to the case of Wilkerson ··J 
v. Mc~Carthy, which will be referred to later. The basis of 
the appeal in the Cabana case was the claim of defendant 
that the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor 
of defendant. The Federal Circuit Court, however, stated 
that the negligence of plaintiff, or contributory negligence, 
was a question for the jury to decide and that a directed 
verdict would have been improper. 
On page 64 appellant cites and quotes from the case 
Ctcl '/{)3 of Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53., 69 Sup. Ct. 413. 
Counsel should get no comfort from that case because that 
case again involves solely the question as to whether the 
court should have directed a verdict or whether it should 
have been left to the jury to decide whether the railroad 
was guilty of negligence and whether Wilkerson himself was 
guilty of contributory negligence. In the Wilkerson case 
there were two ways open to the employe and it was con-
tended that he should have chosen the safer, in spite of the 
fact that the evidence showed that numerous other employes 
took the same path that he did across the slippery board. 
The Supreme Cqurt of the United States in reversing the 
case said : (quoting from the syllabus.) 
''In this action under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act there was evidence (detailed in the 
opinion) which would support a jury finding of 
negligence on the part of the defendants and it was 
error for the trial court to direct a verdict against 
the plaintiff." 
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Upon the question of negligence generally, the Supreme 
Court said: 
''l\1uch of respondents' argument here is devoted 
to the proposition that the Federal Act does not 
make the railroad an absolute insurer against per-
sonal injury damages suffered by its employees. 
That proposition is correct, since the Act imposes 
liability only for negligent injuries. Cf. 'Coray v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 335 U. S. 520. But the issue of 
negligence is one for juries to determine according 
to their finding of whether an employer's conduct 
measures up to what a reasonable and prudent per-
son would have done under the same circumstances. 
And a jury should hold a master 'liable for injuries 
attributable to conditions under his control when 
they are not such as a reasonable man ought to main-
tain in the circumstances,' bearing in mind that 'the 
standard of care must be commensurate. to the dan-
gers of the business'." 
With respect to the contributory negligence of the employe 
the United States Supreme Court- s~ted the language as 
quoted on pages 64 and· 65 of appellant's- brief and we wish 
to call particular attention to the part therein that states: 
"* * * while petitioner's failure to use a safer method -
of crossing might be found by the jury to be contributory 
negligence, the Act provides_ * * * ." Thus the Supreme 
Court in the Wilkers'on case holds that while the jury may, 
where there is evidence, as there was in that case, find 
negligence on the part of the railroad com-p-any, at the 
same time "PETITIONER'S F AlL-URE T!Q USE A SAFER 
METHOD OF 'CROSS:ING MIGHT BE FOUND BY THE 
JURY TO BE C·ONTRIBUTORY.NE-GLIGENCE." 
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In the case at bar in Instruction No. 19 the trial court 
instructed the jury that the employe had the responsibility 
to act as a reasonable, prudent man and that if a reasonable, 
prudent man 'would have discovered and used a safer way, 
then the jury could find the plaintiff guilty of negligence 
if they found that he did not act as a reasonable, prudent 
man would have done in using the safer way. The Wilkerson 
case is authority to sustain the trial court in the giving of 
Instruction No. 19-. In the case at bar the question of negli-
gence on the part of both plaintiff and defendant was sub-
mitted to the jury and counsel cannot complain of the man-
ner in which it was submitted. The law sustains the· in-
structions as given, and by failing to take proper exceptions 
thereto appellant is precluded by law from- urging error 
herein. 
At two or three points in his argument appellant com-
plains because the court included in the instructions a basis 
upon which the jury could find that the negligence of the 
plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. We 
submit that such instructions were correct, but plaintiff did 
not in amy instance except to such portion of any of tke 
instructions and he is now out of order in complaining of 
the quest~on of proximate cause as so submitted' by the court. 
With respect to counsel's argument on the question of 
assumption of risk we would like to refer the court to the 
case of Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Skinner's Admx., (Ky.) 197 
S. W. 552. That case involved a suit for the death of an 
employe under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The 
case was decided at a time when assumption of risk was still 
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a complete defense and had asumption of risk been deter-
mined to be the basis of injury in that case, there would 
have been no right of recovery. In that case it was argued 
that the deceased employe chose an unsafe way of doing a 
particular job when a safe place was equally available to 
him. In connection with this and upon the point of assump-
tion of risk, the Kentucky Appellate Court said : 
"* * * the decision of this and other courts 
hold that the failure to choose the safe, instead of an 
unsafe way, is contributory negligence, and not as-
sumed risk; and hence, under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act does not bar a recovery, but is to be 
considered by the jury in diminution of the dam-
ages." 
We do not think the argument of assumption of risk merits 
any further discussion. 
With respect to the obligation on the ·part of an em-
ploye to use reasonable care to choose a safe way when 
there is more than one way available, we would like to refer 
the court to the following authorities : 
The text Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (1941 
Edition) at page 332, states as a general rule that it is a 
well settled rule of law that a voluntary choice of an un-
safe method of procedure when a safe way is open and 
obvious, c~nstitutes contributory negligence. 
This question has been presented to this ·court in a 
prior case and was passed upon by this. court in the case of 
Raymond v. Union Pacific R. Co., ... Utah ... , 191 P·. (2d) 
137. That was not a Federal Employers' Liability Act case 
but did involve a man with railroad experience handling 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
80 
the switching of cars at the Remington Arms Plant at Salt 
Lake City for the federal government. The facts of that 
case showed that the plaintiff employe chose an unsafe way 
to do his work when a safe way was available to him. The 
trial court held him guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law and upon that point this court sustained the trial court 
by giving only the following short statement: 
"The obvious truth from plaintiff's own testi-
mony is that he gave no thought to his own safety. 
I-I e placed his hand in a position which he knew to 
be dangerous, when there was a safe method open to 
him. The court below correctly held that plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law." 
In the case at bar the court did not hold the plaintiff to be 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law, but instructed the 
jury that where an employe has two ways of performing 
an act, the one safe and the other dangerous, if he as a rea-
sonable man should have discovered that one was safe and 
the other dangerous, he owed a duty to use reasonable and 
ordinary care to use the safe way. The court told the jury 
that if they found that the plaintiff by the exercise of rea-
sonable and ordinary care would have discovered· that one 
way was safer than the other, but nevertheless, if he did 
not do that which he as a reasonable and prudent man should 
have done, the jury could find him guilty of negligence. 
See also 
Groome v. City of Statesville, (N. C.) 177 S. E. 
638. 
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Ghee's Admx., (Va.) 
66 S. E. 826. 
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Harrison v. Myers Construction Co., (8th C. C. 
A.) 42 F. (2d) 950. 
Balente v. Lindner, (Pa.) 17 A. (2d) 371. 
Snrith v. City of Pittsburg, (Pa.) 12 A. (2d) 788. 
Wolfe v. Henwood, 162 F. (2d) 998. 
Uzich v. E. & G. Brooke Iron Co., 76 Fed. Supp. 
788. 
We submit that plaintiff's charge of error in his state-
ment of point 7 and as argued under his Point V should 
be denied and decided adversely to appellant. 
POINT VI 
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS NOT CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE, EITHER UNCONTRO-
VERTED OR OTHERWISE, AS PRESENTED 
AT THE TRIAL. 
In arg~ing under their Point VI counsel for appepant 
do not indicate just which particular statement of error 
they address their remarks to. We assume, but are not sure, 
that counsel must refer to statement of error No. 10 where-
in they charge the trial court with error in refusing to 
grant plaintiff's motion for· new trial after the second trial. 
At this point counsel for appellant repeat the statement 
of their theory of the case and also give a considerable 
amount of repetition of the facts in the case. On page 75 
of appellant's brief they state: 
"Plaintiff sincerely contends that the evidence, 
as herein outlined, was sufficient for the court to 
have granted a directed verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff on the issue of defendant's neglect as a con-
tributing cause of plaintiff's injuries * * *" 
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We are surprised at counsel's attitude and can only say 
this is a good example of a situation where counsel become 
so convinced of their own thoughts upon a subject and of 
the truth of the testimony given by their own witnesses that 
-
they cannot conceive that anybody would contradict them, 
or that any contradictory evidence that might have been 
produced was worthy of belief by either court or jury. 
At this point we must remind counsel for the plaintiff 
that even the jury in the first case which rendered an 
original verdict for the entire amount which plaintiff had 
asked held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, at least to the extent of 40 percent. The court, 
after having heard the entire case and after having con-
sidered it for sometime after the trial, and after having 
heard arguments upon the motion for a new trial, stated 
that he had become convinced since the trial that he had 
erred in not granting the motion for directed verdict, thus 
in effect stating he had concluded that the defendant was 
not negligent in failing to remove all ice and snow from 
the ties. At any rate, he stated that in his opinion the plain-
tiff was guilty of more than the 40 percent of the total 
negligence. 
We would have to conclude from counsel's argument 
under appellant's Point V that counsel for appellant feel 
that there ·was no basis for submitting to the jury the ques-
tion of whether or not plaintiff was guilty of any contri-
butory negligence at all, in spite of the fact that all of the 
defendant's witnesses testified that it was not proper to 
attempt to throw the switch from a position where the 
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switchman '\vould be standing on the ties. Now in Point 
VI counsel argue that the court should have directed aver-
dict for plaintiff on the question of defendant's n~gligence. 
Therefore, the only logical conclusion that could follow from 
counsel's argument is that the court should have decided 
the question of negligence on behalf of both parties ad-
versely to defendant as a matter of law and submitted the 
matter to the jury solely upon the question as to how much 
damage the plaintiff had sustained. Would counsel argue 
as a result of the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in the lV ilkerson case that instead of directing a 
verdict for the defendant, the trial court should have directed 
a verdict for the plaintiff Wilkerson? In that case there 
were two places where Wilkerson could have walked in 
performing his work, and the trial court directed a verdict 
in favor of the railroad company because another and safer 
place was available where plaintiff should have walked. 
The Supreme Court of the United States did not say that 
because of the fact that the jury might have found that 
Wilkerson acted as a reasonable man in walking across 
the board where he walked that therefore the defendant 
should be found guilty of negligence as a matter of law, nor 
that Wilkerson should be found to be free of negligence as 
a matter of law. The United State Supreme Court said that 
under the circumstances it was for the jury to decide wheth-
er the defendant was negligent in leaving the greasy board 
available so that Wilkerson could walk on it, not that the 
defendant was negligent as a matter of law, and the United 
States Supreme Court also held that Wilkerson's voluntary 
choice and decision to walk across the greasy board could 
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have been considered by the jury in determining whether 
or not Wilkerson was guilty of contributory negligence. 
Just so in the case at bar, in applying the Wilkerson 
case to this case, it may be that the trial court considered 
that he would not hold the defendant to be free from negli-
gence as a matter of law because there was ice on these 
I 
switch ties, even though the evidence was in conflict as to 
whether or not it was proper to stand on the ties when 
manipulating the switch although a safer and more normal 
place on the gravel ballast was available. Just so in this 
case also, the trial court s~bmitted to the jury the question 
as to whether or not Williams, in choosing to stand on the 
switch ties to manipulate the switch, acted as a reasonable 
man or whether he was negligent in so doing. The Wilker-
son case is direct authority for such submission. 
As a crowning point in counsel's solicitousness of their 
client, we refer to their statement on page 7 4 of appellant's 
brief, where it is stated: 
"* * * Sixteen hours had elapsed during 
which time the switch tender on duty could have 
taken a shovel out to the area of the switch stand 
and cleaned it, * * *" 
--
yes, the court instructed the jury that the defendant 
would be responsible for the negligence of its employes, and 
if other employes were negligent the plaintiff could take 
advantage of that fact. It is true that ~here were two switch 
tenders on duty after the plaintiff had left his duty the day 
before, and plaintiff's counsel now as a final shot say that 
because of that 16 hours that had elapsed.with two shifts of 
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switch tenders who succeeded plaintiff at his post, one or 
the other of those switch tenders should have taken a shovel 
out to the S\vitch stand and cleaned it. In saying so do 
counsel recognize the fact that it is equally true that the 
, plaintiff himself could have taken either the shovel or the 
broom out to the switch stand and could, with one swath, 
have removed all snow and slush from the ties (he could 
not have dried it out anymore than defendant could). Plain-
- tiff was at work for a couple of hours after the storm had 
= ceased and there was no more snow during the following 
: 16 hours. Plaintiff did not think it was necessary to clean 
~ this snow avvay, yet he wants to charge the other employes 
: and the defendant with negligence because they did not 
~ determine it to be l!ecessary. 
Here it is interesting to note just what the eviden~e 
shows with respect to circumstances surrounding this area. 
:: Exhibit "L" introduced by plaintiff shows that the total 
::. amount of the water equivalent of the precipitation from 
midnight of December 7 to midnight of December 8 was 
J 0.06 inches; that during this same period there was a total 
~ of 1.0 inches snowfall. The depth of the snow on the ground 
:: at midnight December 7 was 5.2 inches, and yet with an 
additional inch of snowfall thereafter, the depth of snow 
~ on the ground at midnight on December 8 was 2.0 inches. 
~ On December 9 there was no precipitation, and the depth 
:i· of snow on the ground at midnight December 9 was 1.0 
~~ inches. During the three days in question the temperature 
:~ranged from a minimum of 29° F., which was reached some-
§J· time after the accident occurred, to a maximum of 42° F., 
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which was reached on midafternoon of December 8, as 
shown by plaintiff's Exhibit "M". Thus, as shown by Ex-
hibit "L", the depth of snow on the ground at the time of 
plaintiff's injury was something less than, or at least not 
in excess of two inches-the depth at midnight December 
8. In fact, we could assume that it was something less than 
that because at midnight on December 8 the temperature 
stood at 34 o F., and thereafter for the seven hours plus until 
plaintiff was injured, the temperature ranged from one to 
three degrees above freezing, and there would have been 
some additional melting of this snow. Should the railroad 
company, being charged with acting as a reasonable person 
would act under the circumstances, have anticipated that 
during such wet, snowy weather, with the snow melting 
fast and with only two inches of snow on the ground at the 
time of the accident, that such condition would have been 
in any way hazardous to an experienced switchman in going 
from switch to switch and manipulating them, where gravel 
ballast is provided for such a switchman to walk and stand 
on and where the melting snows do not puddle to freeze but 
seep away in such ballast (R. 78-1) ? 
We question very much whether the defendant could be 
charged with negligence in the first instance here. We 
think that there was as much ground, if not more of a proper 
basis, for directing a verdict in favor of the defendant in 
this case than there was in the Wilkerson case. In this 
country and this particular area 'Ye are met in our daily life 
every winter with icy conditions, and with such conditions 
which might change in a few minutes. People in their normal 
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everyday walks of life during winter weather have occasions 
where they must walk and work in snow to a depth of two 
inches, or more, very often. 
Here again it is interesting to note the evidence pro-
duced over the signature of plaintiff and appellant Williams 
himself. Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 were statements taken by thr~e 
separate indivduals, all of which were signed by Williams, 
and in connection with each of which over his signature, 
and before signing, vV1lliams stated that he had read the 
same and that it was true. The matters contained in Exhibit 
5, according to testimony which was uncontradicted (since 
appellant's counsel have chosen to refer to uncontradicted 
testimony), were matters that were taken in shorthand 
verbatim as Mr. Williams stated it (R. 189-191-2). In that 
statement 'Villiams said: 
"There were several inches of snow on the 
ground at this location, but in the vicinity of this 
switch it had been cleaned away but there was a 
light covering of ice on the ties which was covered 
with frost and this is what caused me to slip. There 
was no defective condition of the switch, roadbed 
or ties or anything else that I know of that con-
tributed to this injury, was merely a case of me 
slipping due to this light covering of ice and frost." 
We particularly want the court to remember this state-
ment with respect to frost, and this statement was signed 
just four days after the accident. 
Exhibit 6, also a statement, was taken by one of the 
railroad claim agents over two months after the accident 
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in plaintiff's home and witnessed by his daughter. In that 
statement the plaintiff said: 
"There was nothing whatsoever defective about 
the switch stand or the ties or in fact the·re was 
nothing about any of the equipment which caused 
or contributed to my injury * * * 
"There was nothing that the 0. U. R. & D. or 
any of its servants could have done to have pre-
vented this accident. It is just one of those accidents 
that happens and as I put it the Great Almighty him-
self was responsible for what happened to me." 
The statement, Exhibit 7, was taken by another claim 
agent almost a year after the accident and not long before 
filing of the complaint, and in that statement Williams said: 
"The condition which I think had something to 
do with my injury was the fact that the ties and 
irons were all ice-coated, but the cinders and gravel 
were not icy as the water had went through them." 
At the trial of the case counsel for plaintiff belabored 
and berated the claim agents for taking such statements, 
and we recognize the fact that not only attorneys in such 
cases, but even judges from the bench, have taken their 
turn in criticizing claim agents. Nevertheless with respect 
to these statemep.ts the plaintiff said, referring to Exhibit 
5 (R. 129-2) : 
"Q. Was what was written there the truth? 
"A. Yes, that is true. Just exactly how it hap-
pened, I told the truth all the way through. 
"Q. All right, Exhibit 6 that Mr. Hills took 
right in your bed room was that the truth? 
"A. Yes, sir that is the truth too." 
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Those statements reflect the attitude and opinion that 
Williams had before his attorneys filed his complaint for 
him, and after two trials, at the conclusion of the second 
trial as just referred to, Mr. ,~Villiams emphatically said 
that it \Yas still the truth (R. 129-2). 
The plaintiff himself did not think that the situation 
surrounding the accident was such as to cause any reason-
able man concern. It had stopped snowing nearly three 
hours before he left shift on the 8th day of December, and 
the only amount of precipitation that there was at all on 
the 8th consisted of light snow showers during the fore-
noon of the 8th as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit "M", and 
during the whole of that time that precipitation amounted 
to only one inch total snowfall, with a water content of .06 
inches. With respect to this on the 8th, Williams did not 
know when the sectionmen came to clean the snow away. 
He said: "They had cleared it away previous to this day 
on several occasions when we had had a snow;". and then 
he added: "I don't remember of them being there on the 
morning of the 8th, no, sir because there wasn't enough 
snow there right in the morning to I don't think call to 
their attention but they'd come down later in the afternoon, 
maybe after I had gone off shift" (R. 94-2). Thus even 
the plaintiff himself did not think there was enough snow 
there to call their- attention to it on the morning of the 8th, 
and he did not know whether or not they had yet cleared it 
off. 
Suppose the railroad company had removed all of the 
snow from the switch ties. What would a reasonable man 
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anticipate? If during stormy weather such as then existed 
the weather got down to freezing, there would be frost on 
the ties in the early morning even if there were no ice at all 
on the ties, and such frost would make them slick. Suppose 
there had been no snow at all but merely normal frost on 
the ties the morning of the accident. Would the plaintiff 
Williams claim that the defendant had the responsibility 
of removing the frost and drying out the ties for him? What 
reasonable care could a person take in eliminating such 
condition of frost to remove a slippery condition from the 
ties? Such frost would make the ties slippery and no amount 
of reasonable care or foresight on the part of any individual 
. could protect a workman, but a reasonable man should be 
allowed to anticipate that an employe in the position that 
Williams was in would act as a reasonable man and would 
stand on the gravel ballast rather than on the frosty ties. 
AN EMPLOYER IS NOT BOUND TO ANTICIPATE 
THAT AN EMPLOYE WILL ACT NEGLIGENTLY AND 
PROVIDE AGAINST· SUCI-I NEGLIGENCE IN AD-
VANCE. 
It must be kept in mind that the plaintiff, with three 
switches to take care of, had to cross the river bridge in 
walking between them. It could just as well be argued that 
the defendant company was under the obligation not only 
of cleaning all snow away but of drying a path for plaintiff 
wherever he had to walk or work, as also to do the same 
with respect to other employes. Such an attitude would re-
quire not only the clearing away of all snow from all of the 
Ogden yard, but would also require the drying of the yard 
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in some manner so that residual wetness on the ground 
would not freeze, or so that the atmosphere, containing 
moisture as it does under such stormy conditions, would 
not condense in frost upon iron rails or wooden ties in the 
morning such as was the case here. The absurdity of such 
a proposition is a sufficient answer. An employer is not 
the insurer of the safety of his employes while they are on 
duty, and an employer is not required to eliminate all dan-
ger, Ellis v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 329 U. S. 649, and 
an employe can be presumed to be a reasonable man and held 
to act as such. 
We assume that counsel will again cry out that by 
such a statement we are again reviving the doctrine of as-
sumption of risk. The doctrine of assumption of risk a p-
plied to risks that are attendant upon or inherent in a par-
ticular type of work, and it was- never held in any of the 
cases nor assumed by the courts that the question of assump-
tion of risk applied where the risks, if such they could be 
called, were not peculiar to the work itself, but only condi-
tions which were normal to an area and which all people 
living in the area met in their day-to-day work or in going 
to and fro, whether at work or not. 
Williams had already crossed over the Weber river 
bridge, and the bridge was icy and he had to be careful 
going across (R. 79-2). Williams had also had to walk on 
some sort of a path between the three switches, and plain-
tiff's Exhibit I shows something of the nature of the path-
way followed by plaintiff between the switch shanty and 
the switch where the injury occurred. It appears that there 
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is a spot or two of ice on the boards leading from the switch 
· shanty. Should the defendant have likewise cleaned and 
dried those boards? Should the defendant have cleaned all 
snow and dried a path between that switch shanty and 
switch 2, different than the path appears in plaintiff's 
Exhibit I? Should the defendant have cleared all the spots 
of melting snow and in some manner removed all of the 
residual wetness from the ties shown in Exhibit 10? This 
Exhibit 10 shows where plaintiff had to walk in crossing 
from the switch shanty to switch number 2. Defendant's 
Exhibit 8 shows something of the circumstances surround-
ing the switch stand where the injury occurred. The picture 
is looking to the west and is taken opposite to where Wil-
liams should have stood in manipulating the switch, and 
Williams testified that he did stand to the west or opposite 
side of the switch from the view shown in the picture when 
he first manipulated it (R. 51-52-2 and 82-2), and it appears 
that there was gravel ballast which would have given him 
good footing. 
Counsel argue on page 7 4 of their brief that it. was 
uncontroverted that ice covered the switch ties and the 
"ice and snow covered the area around the switch stand." 
Counsel misstate the record. Defendant's witness John E. 0. 
Burton, who appears in the picture Exhibit I, states with 
reference to ice on the ties: "There wasn't ice, there was 
particles of snow that had partly melted and froze but it 
was not covered with ice" ( R. 185-2). The plaintiff himself 
confirmed this, both in his testimony and his statement, 
Exhibit 7, above referred to wherein he said that "the 
cinders and gravel were not icy." 
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In connection 'vith this matter and as an answer to 
plaintiff's argument, while \Ve think the Wilkerson case is a 
sufficient and a direct answer thereto, we would like to call ?~ L. Ed. J!J 
the court's attention to the case of ftlissouri Pacific Railroad ~r s. et.111 Co. v. Aeby, 275 U. S. 426. In that case the United States 
Supreme Court reversed a judgment against the railroad 
company on a basis that no negligence had been shown, and 
while the case was decided prior to the change in the law 
with respect to assumption of risk, the court in its opinion 
excluded the question of assumption of risk from its decision. 
That case involved an agent in the employ of the defendant 
railroad company and involved slipping on an icy path where 
the circumstances were much stronger against the railroad 
company than in the case at bar. Water had dripped from 
the eaves of the depot building and had accumulated in a 
depression on the gravelled "platform". This depression was 
near the door entrance to the waiting room and was about 
four inches deep. The depression had been there for some 
time. "During the night it rained, froze and snowed." Ice 
had formed in this depression and then it was covered with 
snow. The employe went out and passed over the spot once 
but when returning to the waiting room slipped, fell and 
was injured. 
In holding that the railroad company was not negligent 
the United States· Supreme Court said: 
"This case is governed by the Act and the ap-
plicable principles of common law as established and 
applied in federal courts. There is no liability in the 
absence of negligence on the part of the carrier. 
* * * Its duty in respect of the platform did not 
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make petitioner an insurer of respondent's safety; 
there was no guaranty that the place would be ab-
solutely safe. The measure of duty in such cases is 
reasonable care having regard to the circumstances. 
* * * The petitioner was not required to have 
any particular type or kind of platform or to main-
tain it in the safest and best possible condition. 
* * * No employment is free from danger. 
Fault or negligence on the part of petitioner may 
not be inferred from the mere fact that respondent 
fell and was hurt. She knew that it had rained and 
that the place was covered with ice and snow. Her 
knowledge of the situation and of whatever danger 
existed was at least equal to that chargeable against 
the petitioner. Petitioner was not required to give 
her warning. * * * It is a matter of common 
knowledge that almost everywhere there are to be 
found in public ways and on private grounds num-
erous places in' general use by pedestrians that in 
similar weather are not materially unlike the place 
where respondent fell. Under the circumstances, it 
cannot reasonably be held that failure of petitioner 
to remove the snow and ice violated) any duty owed 
to her. * * *" (Italics ours.) 
Again we state, the Supreme Court decided that case 
on the ground of lack of negligence and stated with respect 
to petitioner: "we need not consider its contentions in 
respect of assumption of risk and negligence on the part 
of respondent." 
We would like also to refer the court to the case of 
Wolfe v. Henwood, (Eighth Circuit) 162 F. (2d) 998. The 
plaintiff, a section hand, used gasoline to clean oil from 
his clothes, which he got on in the course of his work. He 
went to dispose of some old gasoline which he had thus used, 
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lit a match which caught fire to his glove, and then he 
slapped his leg with the glove, the gasoline on his trousers 
caught fire, and he burned to death. 
After a verdict had been granted to the plaintiff, the 
trial court granted judgment for the defendant notwith-
standing the verdict. This was affirmed by the Eighth 
Circuit Court, and we quote from the opinion : 
"The defendant had the duty to use reasonable 
care to furnish Wolfe a safe place in which to per-
form his work. * * * But defendant's obliga-
tion was not such as to impose liability for injury re-
gardless of due care and regardless of whether the 
injury was one reasonably to be anticipated or fore-
seen as a natural con.sequence of defendant's act. 
* * * (Italics ours.) 
" '* * * the employer's liability is to be de-
termined under the general rule which defines neg-
ligence as the lack of due care under the circum-
stances; or the failure to do what a reasonable and 
prudent man would ordinarily have done under the 
circumstances of the situation; or doing wh~t such 
a person under the existing circumstances would not 
have done. A fair generalization of the rule is given 
in the Senate Committee report on the 1939 amend-
ment: "In justice, the master ought to be held liable 
for injuries attributable to conditioRs under his 
control when they are not such as a reasonable man 
ought to maintain in the circumstances." Of course 
in any case the standard of care must be commen-
surate to the dangers of the business. * * *' " 
Here we have a situation where on December 8 there 
were only two inches of snow on the ground (Exhibit L) ; 
and the weather in the main was considerably above freez-
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ing and had been continued wet and stormy. The section 
hands had at least cleaned the major portion of the snow 
away from the switch points, as well as an area on the 
ballast to the west of the switch stand where they would 
assume a switchman would stand. There was no ice or 
frozen snow on this ballast, water from melting snow having 
seeped away into the ballast (R. 211-2, Exhibit 7). In ad-
dition, a broom and hand shovel were available, and ac-
cording to defendant's witness, they were as much a part 
of a switchman's equipment as they were of a sectionman's 
(R. 182, 186-187-1). 
Unde-r the circumstances, the question should be wheth-
er the injury as occurred to Williams here was one "reason-
ably to be anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence 
of defendant's act." Instead of being one that should have 
been reasonably foreseen, we think there is a serious ques-
tion that the accident even happened as alleged considering 
the manner in which Williams claims to have fallen. He 
stated that he fell to the east, although he states it was his 
left leg which slipped and it slipped to the east. He had 
his right hand on the switch stand and his left hand on the 
lever to the west, and with his left leg slipping to the east he 
would normally have fallen to the west. Considering 
also the depth of the clearing between the two switch 
ties where Williams stated that his leg went, there would 
have been only six or seven inches, and the injury or break 
suffered by Williams being at least double that distance 
up from the bottom of his foot, we feel that we can say, as 
was said by this court in the case of Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 
111 Utah 25, 176 P. (2d) 111, at page 117: 
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"Plaintiff's contention that the verdict is against 
the great weight of the evidence is obviously without 
foundation to anyone who reads the record. The im-
probability of the fall occurring as the plaintiff testi-
fied it did,'' (and other facts placed before the jury 
and argued at length) "clearly support the verdict of 
no cause of action." 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that Judge Hendricks 
could have granted a new trial without requiring any re-
mission from the original jury's verdict, and he did not 
commit error in granting the new trial on the basis used 
by him. 
Plaintiff's theory was fully presented and argued at 
length upon every point claimed by appellant's counsel, and 
the trial court did not commit error either in the giving of 
instructions, nor refusing to , give Instructions No. 4 and 
No. 5 requested by the plaintiff, nor in refusing plaintiff's 
request for a new trial. 
We therefore respectfully submit that the verdict of 
the jury and the judgment of the court thereon, including 
the order of the court denying the motion for new trial, 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
10 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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